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I. CONTRACTOR CASUALTIES-THE HIDDEN COST OF WAR

A. Introduction
Osama Bin Laden's death gave the United States leverage in the war
against AI Qaeda, and some members of Congress are now calling for a
troop withdrawal and an end to military operations in Afghanistan. 1 However, the U.S. invasion of Iraq offers sound evidence that even if such an
order was given, the U.S. military, along with thousands of civilian contractors, would remain in Mghanistan for some time. 2 Long after the toppling of
Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, U.S. troops and civilian contractors remained in Iraq to begin rebuilding infrastructure decimated by years of
war.3 Now, twelve years later, the rebuilding of Iraq continues. 4 Similar rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan are already underway and will likely continue
well into the future. 5
Regardless of when U.S. soldiers withdraw from the Middle East, senior
military officials have pledged their support to these veterans. 6 Many injured
soldiers have been kept alive by improvements in Kevlar vests and other lifesaving equipment but are returning to the United States with permanent disabling injuries. 7 Other returning soldiers are suffering from mental health
disorders and pose a higher suicide risk, a problem that has plagued the military during times oflengthy and repeated troop deployments. 8 Fortunately,
universal, government-provided health care for military members allows
wounded warriors to be treated by world-class physicians and health care
I. See Siobhan Hughes, 27 Senators Call for Sizable Troop Withdrawal front Afghanistan, WALL
ST.)' Gune IS, 2011), http://online.wsj.com!article/BT-CO-20110615-712044.htrnl.
2. See Iraq at War, N.Y. TIMES Gan. 16, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com!top/news/interna
tionallcountriesandterritories/iraq/index.htrnl.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See Afghanistan at War, N.Y. TIMES Gan. 12, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com!top/news/
internationallcountriesandterritories/afghanistanlindex.htrnl.
6. See Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Remarks at the 93rd Annual
Conference of the American Legion (Aug. 30, 2011).
7. See, e.g., Dan Froomkin, How Many U.S. Soldiers Were Wounded in Iraq? Guess Again,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 30, 2011, 10:20 AM), http://www.huffingronpost.com!dan-froomkinl
iraq-soldiers-wounded_b_1176276.htrnl;Jon Schwartz & Edward Iwata, Irrvented to Save Gas, Kevfar Saves Lives, USA TODAY (Apr. 17, 2003), http://www.usatoday.com!money/worldliraq/200304-15-kevlar_x.htrn#.
8. Charles W. Hoge et ai., Combat Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health Problems, and
Barriers to Care, 351 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 13, 14 (2004); see generally Jeffrey Hyman et ai., Suicide
Incidence and Risk Factors in an Active Duty United States Military Population, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
(forthcoming Mar. 2012).
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practitioners. 9 There is, however, a much lesser-known contingent of men
and women working overseas in support of their military brethren who are
not as celebrated or as fortunate. They are America's contractor veterans,
and they too have suffered injuries of war.
Deployed contractors are returning home in record numbers with many of
the same injuries and health issues facing soldiers. Working alongside the military, often in dangerous security roles, contractor veterans are showing signs
of post-traumatic stress and other mental health disorders commonly found
only in soldiers exposed to combat. 10 While a number of government agencies
are tasked with treating both active-duty and veteran soldiers, those same support networks are largely absent for contractors. II Regrettably, this issue has
largely been ignored, even as contractors and military members increasingly
share the same battle space. This ignorance is partly due to an insolent
group of Americans who believe contractors are essentially expendable. 12
They believe that the greatest benefit contractors provide to the Government
is the expiration of their contract. 13 Injured contractors, however, have
recently been able to voice their concerns to members of Congress, and government officials are now beginning to debate the potentially broad and longterm consequences of discounting these contractor veterans. 14
The issue parallels the national health care debate. The cost of treating
the uninsured or underinsured in emergency rooms has caused health care
costs to skyrocket, but solutions for increased coverage are costly and politically contentious. IS Healthy Americans are arguably more productive, consume less health care resources, and are less burdensome on the economy,
but opponents of universal health care argue that the Government cannot
afford health care for all Americans. 16 The debate touches on the fundamental question of whether the Government has some kind of moral obligation
to care for those who cannot care for themselves. One might expect less of a
debate on the issue of whether the Government has an obligation to help
contractor veterans returning from war, as these Americans certainly draw
more sympathy from politicians. Much like the national health care debate,
9. See About the VHA, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., http://www.va.govlhealthiaboutVHA.
asp (last visited Mar. I, 2012).
10. See James Risen, Bock from Iraq, Contractors Face Combat Related Stress, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,
2007, at AI.
II. Id.
12. David Ivanovich, Moneymakers: Contracting Expen Zeros in on Iraq: Five Questions with Steven Schooner, Hous. CHRONICLE (Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.chron.comldefaultiarticle/Money
makers-Contracting-expert-zeroes-in-on-Iraq-I 65 045 5.php.
13. Id.
14. See After Injury, the Bottle Begins: Evaluating Workers' Compensation for Civilian Contractors
in War Zones: Hearing Before the H. Comm. an Oversight and Gov't Reform, III th Congo 9 (2009)
[hereinafter 2009 House Hearing].
IS. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.

119 (2010).
16. Joe Messerli, Should the Government Provide Free Universal Health Core for All Americam?,
BALANCEDPOLITICS, http://www.balancedpolitics.org/universal_health_care.htm (last visited
Mar. I, 2012).
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however, Congress has been steadfastly focused on the rising cost of the
insurance that contractors use to protect their employees. 17
Rather than limiting reform efforts to fiscal matters, this Article calls upon
Congress to capitalize on the opportunity to correct substantive issues plaguing the Defense Base Act (DBA)18 insurance system. Congress recently
passed legislation requiring the secretary of defense to adopt a new acquisition strategy for insurance required by the DBA. 19 While cost should be a
consideration of any new strategy for securing DBA insurance, Congress
must consider salient noncost-related benefits when weighing the merits of
various strategies. Injured contractors returning from Iraq and Mghanistan
are being denied reimbursement for medical treatment by their DBA insurance carriers. 2o The problem is occurring with even more frequency when
claims are filed by contractors who suffer from mental illness related to combat stress. 21 Members of Congress have a duty and an obligation to support
contractor veterans and their families, and they must fulfill that obligation
when they choose a new DBA acquisition strategy.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I describes the problems encountered by injured contractors as they return from war. Part II discusses how the
regulatory scheme for insuring contractors contributes to the problems experienced by contractors. Part III offers practical suggestions for Congress and the
Department of Defense (DoD) as they prepare to adopt a new DBA acquisition
strategy. Finally, Part IV asserts that the current open-market insurance strategy
is inadequate and argues that Congress should implement a multiple-provider
system for DBA insurance. In the short term, a multiple-provider strategy
best addresses DBA insurance costs and claims processing concerns and can
be implemented swiftly and without extensive changes to the law. In addition,
Congress should begin taking steps to implement government self-insurance,
which offers even greater savings and benefits for injured contractors.
B. Contractor Death Toll Exceeds That of u.s. Military in Iraq and Afkhanistan

While the efforts of the men and women in uniform are often publicly
lauded, contractor contributions are frequently overlooked. Americans are
well aware of the service members whose lives have been lost in Iraq and
Mghanistan but are well insulated from the contractor death toll. Contracting is the primary means by which the U.S. military is able to complete its
mission without exceeding the personnel limitations imposed by Congress. 22
The current wars would not be sustainable relying on the military alone.
17. See 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 10.

18. Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.c. §§ 1651-54 (2006).
19. See Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L.
No. 110-417, §843, 122 Stat. 4502, 4540 (2008).
20. 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 2.
21. See id. at 183.
22. See Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No.
111-383, §401, 124 Stat. 4137, 4202.
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The military's increased reliance on contractors in recent wars has raised
new issues regarding the treatment of injured contractors returning from
overseas. Contractors have historically been used to supplement the military
by performing tasks that are not "inherently governmental."23 The line
between what is and is not inherently governmental, however, is becoming
increasingly blurred. Examples of not "inherently governmental" functions
include providing support services to a military base, such as maintaining
the grounds, operating the dining facilities, and performing laundry services. 24 In addition to these traditional "not inherently governmental services," however, DoD contractors also provide security detail services,
such as those provided by Xe Services, formerly Blackwater Worldwide. 25
As of March 2011, base support and security services made up about eighty
percent of the work performed by DoD contractors in Iraq.26 Consequently,
as military resources are stretched thin by lengthy military operations on two
fronts, the distinction between what is and is not inherently governmental
has become rather opaque. Further, due to the number of contractors working in hazardous duty 10cations,27 the risk to these contractors has increased
dramatically. Now, the issue for the Government is how to manage the returning contractor workforce, which often suffers from many of the same
physical and mental maladies as military veterans.
Professor Steven L. Schooner has written extensively on the topic of contractor fatalities. 28 His articles have unveiled shocking statistics and brought
much-needed attention to the dangers contractors face as they risk their lives
to support the military. Between January and June 2010, more military contractors than uniformed service members were killed in Afghanistan and
Iraq.29 There were reportedly 250 contractor deaths and 235 military deaths

23. See FAR 7.5. Inherently governmental refers to employment functions that are typically
performed by military or federal civilian employees rather than contract or employees.
24. See MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., R40764, DoD CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ &
AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 15 (2011).
25. See generally Mark Mazzetti & Emily B. Hager, Secret Desert Force Setup by Blackwater's
Founder, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.coml20 11105/15/world/middleeastl
15 prince.html?ref=blackwaterusa.
26. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 15.
27. See Steven L. Schooner, Wby Contractor Fatalities Matter, 38(3) PARAMETERS 78, 78 (2008).
28. Steven L. Schooner is co-director of the Government Procurement Law Program at The
George Washington University Law School and the Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government
Contract Law. His most recent publications on government contractor fatalities include the following: id.; Steven L. Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Contractors and the Ultimate Sacrifice, SERVo
CONTRACTOR., Sept. 2010, at 16 [hereinafter Schooner & Swan, Contractors & the Ultimate Sacrifice]; Steven L. Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Dead Contractors: The Un-examined Effect of Surrogates on the Public's Casualty Sensitivity, J. NAT'L SEC. LAW & POL'y (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Schooner & Swan, Dead Contractors].
29. See Rogene Fisher Jacquette, Contractor Deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan Outnumber Service
Member Deaths, N.Y. TIMES BLOG: AT WAR: NOTES FRO'" THE FRONTLII\'ES (Sept. 23, 2010, 2:27
PM), http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.coml20 1010912 31con tractor-dea ths-in -iraq-and -afghanistan-out
number-service-member-deaths/?scp= 1&sq=contractor%20deaths%2 Ooumumber&st=cse.
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during the six-month period. 30 Even more startling is that three times as
many contractor injuries have been reported than military injuries since
the beginning of operations in Iraq in 200Pl These statistics reflect an
upward trend in contingency contracting casualties, and the contractor
death toll is increasing exponentially compared to military fatalities. Between
2003 and 2010, contractor deaths rose from five percent of the annual death
toll to more than fifty percent. 32 As of March 2011, there were approximately 155,000 private contractors employed by the DoD in Iraq and
Afghanistan compared to approximately 145,000 uniformed personnel. 33
Most surprisingly, contractors currently account for approximately fiftytwo percent of the workforce in Iraq and Afghanistan 34 and on average
have outnumbered military personnel in Afghanistan for the last two
years. 35 This support has undoubtedly contributed to the success of the military, but the reliance on contractors has come at a cost.
Professor Schooner's articles have brought much-needed transparency to
a quiet corner of government contracting. Policymakers and legislatures, as
well as the general public, have ignored the risks to contractors and have
hardly raised an eyebrow at the staggering trend in contractor fatalities. 36
But perhaps equally as troubling is the trend in contractor injuries, which
may have even further-reaching consequences. Few organizations have
tracked injuries sustained by contractor veterans, and even fewer have advocated for contractors or provided support for their injuries. 37 Insurance companies have predominantly been responsible for employee injuries, but this
has only resulted in increased profits for carriers and excessive denial of
claims for injured workers.38 Given the limited number of remedies under
the current regulatory scheme, the Government has not been able to limit
costs or provide greater care for contractors. Thus, while contractors are
dying in record numbers, insurance carriers are seeing unprecedented increases in revenue and profit. 39

30. /d.
31. See Schooner & Swan, Contractors & the Ultimate Sacrifice, supra note 28, at 16, 17.
32. Id. at 17.
33. SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 6. The number of contractor and military personnel in Iraq
and Mghanistan has decreased from approximately 207,600 contractors and 175,000 military in
March 2010. MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONGo REsEARCH SERV., R40764, DoD CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ &
AFGHANISTAN: BACKGROUND & ANALYSIS 5 (2010).
34. SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at Summary.
35. See James Glanz, Contractors Outnumbe:r U.S. Troops in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1,
2009), http://www.nytimes.coml2009/09/02/woridiasial02contractors.html.
36. See Schooner & Swan, Contractors & the Ultimate Sacrifice, supra note 28, at 18.
37. /d.
38. See infra Part liLA.
39. See Schooner, supra note 27, at 78; OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SEC'y OF DEF. ACQUISI.
TION & TECH., DEP'T OF DEF., ACQUIsmON STRATEGY FOR DEF. BASE Acr INSURANCE, REpORT
TO CONGRESS i, available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpf/docs/acq_strategy_defense_
base_accinsurance.pdf [herinafter DoD REPORT TO CONGRESS].
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C. Contractor Veterans Encounter Difficulties After Overseas Employment
The miracle of Kevlar has helped keep many contractors alive. 4o But, after
sustaining traumatic injuries overseas, injured contractors are faced with new
challenges at home. 41 In most cases, family members are able to help manage
their loved ones' illnesses, but filing claims for medical expenses and dealing
with insurance carriers can be a herculean task. 42 Due to the complex nature
of mental health claims, such as those related to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (rBI), the claims process for these
cases can be quite contentious. 43 In fact, insurance carriers deny close to
half of all PTSD claims. 44 For contractors and their families, the process
of appealing the denial of their claims, in addition to managing the symptoms of their illnesses, is overwhelming.
Even more disturbing is that these illnesses are not well-documented. The
DoD did not even begin tracking data on contractors in Iraq and Mghanistan
until the latter half of 2007. 45 It was not until 2008 that the DoD signed an
agreement to use the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker
(SPOT) system, a system designed to track contractor casualties. 46 Before
2007, the most accurate tally of contractor casualties was tracked by the
Department of Labor's (DOL) Division of Longshore and Harbor Worker
Compensation, which tracks insurance claims submitted by the family or
employer of an injured or dead contractor.47 These statistics provide critical
quantitative data, which can be used to estimate the actual cost of DoD operations, since the DoD has historically failed to account for contractor operations. 48 While the implementation of SPOT has assisted the Government
in tracking contractor casualties, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) and the DoD concede that SPOT is still an inadequate source of
data. 49
Current research tracking the mental health of contractors employed in
war zones is even scarcer. Studies conducted on military populations suggest
that contractors working in war zones are probably suffering from the same
mental health disorders as military soldiers. 50 According to Dr. Matthew
Friedman, a Veterans Affairs official who heads the National Center for
40. Schooner & Swan, Dead Contractors, supra note 28, at 14 (citing Atul Gawande, Casualties
of War-Military Care for the Woundedfrom Iraq and Afghanistan, 351 NEW ENGL.]. MED. 2471,
2474 (2004), available at http://www.nejrn.org/doilfuIlIl0.10561NE]Mp048317).
41. See Wounded Civilian Workers Fightfor Care, CBSNEW5.COM Gul. 27, 2009,1:17 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.comlstoriesl2 009/041 17 InationaVrnain49 51906.shtml?tag=contentMain;
contentBody.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. !d.
45. SCHWARTZ, supra note 33, at 4.
46. Id. at 5.
47. See Schooner, supra note 27, at 86.
48. See Schooner & Swan, Dead Contractors, supra note 28, at 19-20.
49. See id. at 17; SCHWARTZ, supra note 33, at 5.
50. See Risen, supra note 10.
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Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, the issue of mental illness in contractors has
never been reviewed by the Government. 51 Only recently have significant
mental health studies on military soldiers in Iraq and Mghanistan been
undertaken. These studies have found that psychological disorders may be
disproportionately high when compared with physical injuries from the
two wars. 52 The studies also show that psychological disorders in the military community are often left untreated. 53 In its 2008 study, the RAND Corporation found that between five and fifteen percent of deployed service
members are affected by PTSD.54 Another two to fourteen percent meet
the diagnostic criteria for major depression. 55 Of the soldiers who screened
positive for a mental health condition, the study found that only one-third
sought mental health support while deployed. 56 About the same number
of soldiers who met screening criteria for a mental health illness received
mental health support upon their return from deployment. 57
The application of these findings to the contractor community reveals a
disturbing picture. Contractor fatalities recently surpassed military fatalities,58 suggesting contractors are being exposed to many of the same hazards
as military members. Given this statistic, it is reasonable to conclude that
there may be a large number of U.S. contractors who are in need of mental
health treatment. This exposure likely includes many second- and third-tier
subcontractors who are not as savvy or sophisticated as prime contractors
and are even less likely to utilize DBA benefits.
One contractor found that a significant percentage of his employees were
not receiving needed mental health care. 59 Paul Brand, a psychologist and
chief executive officer of the firm Mission Critical Psychological Services
(MCPS), L.L.C.,60 independently conducted a study on contractors' mental
health while working at DynCorp, the Department of State's (DOS) largest
51. See id.
52. RAND CORP., INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE INJURIES,
THEIR CONSEQUENCES, AND SERVICES TO AsSIST RECOVERY iii (ferri Tanielian & Lisa H.
Jaycox, eds., 2008), available at http://www.rand.org/contentldamlrandlpubslmonographsl2008/
RAND _MG720.pdf.
53. Id. at 251.
54. Id. at 250.
55. !d.
56. !d. at 251.
57. !d.
58. See Jacquette, supra note 29.
59. See T. Christian Miller, The Other Victims of Battlefield Stress; Defense Contractors' Mental
Health Neglected, PROPUBLlCA.ORG (Feb. 26, 2010, 2:48 AM), http://www.propublica.org/
article/injured-contractors-the-other-victims-of-battlefieId-stress-224.
60. Paul Brand, Ph.D., founded MCPS to offer psychological screening and services for people working in war-torn areas. About Us, MISSION CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVS., LLC, http://
www.missioncriticalpsych.comlsite/epage/64926_765.httn (last visited Mar. 3, 2011). Before
starting MCPS, as the president of Medina & Thompson, Inc., Dr. Brand developed psychological fitness programs to support police officers sent to Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Israel, Liberia, and
East Timor as part of peacekeeping initiatives. !d. Dr. Brand also helped DynCorp International,
the Department of State's largest contractor, become the first company with comprehensive psychological support for its employees serving in Iraq and Mghanistan. Id. Dr. Brand holds his
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contractor. He found that twenty-four percent of contract employees from
DynCorp had symptoms of PTSD or depression after their overseas employment. 61 He also found that many of the contractors had never received mental
health screening and were not receiving treatment for their symptoms. 62 Based
on his study, he estimated that thousands more contractors employed by other
firms were probably not being screened or receiving treatment of any type. 63
The importance of these findings lies in the relationship between mental
health and suicide. Researchers have long believed that mental health and suicide
are closely related. 64 As senior military officials struggle to balance troop deployments with fluctuating financial constraints, they remain highly cognizant of the
long-standing concern about suicide among military personne1. 65 Studies show
that the majority of persons who have committed suicide suffered from at least
one mental disorder.66 Reducing suicide incidents, which is experiencing renewed importance in the military, is therefore dependent upon obtaining treatment for soldiers and contractors who are in need of mental health care.
The fast-paced operations tempo and the duration of recent wars have
caused a rise in suicide among military personnel, a situation that has caught
the 000 by surprise. 67 Between 2005 and 2009, 1,100 military members
took their lives-the equivalent of one member every thirty-six hours. 68
The suicide rate in all services has increased since 2001, but the rate in
the Army has more than doubled. 69 Among Army personnel, the suicide
rate has exceeded that of the civilian population since 2005. 70 The rising suicide rates shocked military leaders and congressional leaders to such an
extent that when Congress passed the Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (NDAA for 2009), they directed
the secretary of defense to establish a task force to examine matters related
to suicide prevention in the armed forces. 71 The secretary of defense
submitted the task force's detailed suicide report to the Committees on
Ph.D. in psychology from the Illinois Institute of Technology and has lived and worked in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, as well as the United States. Id.
61. Miller, supra note 59. As previously mentioned, RAND Corp. reported that five to fifteen
percent of military members reported symptoms of PTSD and two to fourteen percent met the
criteria for major depression. See RAND CORP., supra note 52, at 250. These statistics suggest that
perhaps a higher percentage of contractors are suffering from mental health problems than military members.
62. Miller, supra note 59.
63. Id.
64. See RAND CORP., supra note 52, at 12S.
65. See id.
66. /d.
67. DoD TASK FORCE ON THE PREVENTION OF SUICIDE BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES,
THE CHALLENGE AND THE PROMISE: STRENGTHENING THE FORCE, PREVENTING SUICIDE AND SAVING LIVES 107 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.health.mil/dhb/downloads/Suicide%20
Prevention%20Task%20Force%20report%200S-21-10_V4_RLN.pdf.
6S. Id. at ES-1.
69. Id. at ES-I-ES-2.
70. Id. at 17.
71. See Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L.
No. 110-417, § 733,122 Stat. 4502, 4540 (200S).
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Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives in August
2010.72 They made forty-nine findings and seventy-six recommendations
across four focus areas. 73 While the task force found that military policy
on the delivery of mental health care to the armed forces is well-intended,
it concluded that the system is unorganized and lacking in mental health professionals and other necessary resources. 74
The renewed focus on mental health in the military is a positive sign that
the DoD is finally addressing this critical need of its warfighters. The focus
will undoubtedly improve the overall effectiveness of the u.S. military.
None of the strategies cited in the DoD study and almost none of the DoD's resources, however, will be dedicated to helping U.S. contractors in their fight against
mental illness. Contractors working alongside the U.S. military are experiencing combat stress and battle fatigue but are off the radar and out of the scope
of DoD officials.7 5 Unlike for the military, there is no official support
network in place to help injured contractors cope with the stress of their injuries or navigate the medical claims process. 76 Without the necessary support and resources, contractors are left to fight the symptoms of their illnesses on their own. 77
72. DoD

TASK FORCE ON THE PREVENTION OF SUICIDE BY MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES,

supra note 67, at A-3.
73. Id. at v.
74. Id. at ES-2, ES-6.
75. See Miller, supra note 59.

76. Advocacy or support for wounded contractors has been limited to volunteer providers.
Jana Crowder, who operates a website, Civilian Contractors in Iraq and Mghanistan, http://
www.americancontractorsiniraq.coml. dedicated to injured contractors, is one such provider.
She is the organizer of a Tennessee support group for injured contractors and, though not a
health professional, has helped injured contractor veterans returning from Iraq. See Day to
Day: Iraq Contractors Convene in Tennessee, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 12, 2007), http://www.npr.
org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 7364190.
77. Beginning in 2007, three media outlets, The Los Angeles Times, ABC News, and ProPublica, began reporting on the tribulations of injured contractors returning from Iraq and
Mghanistan. See Day to Day: Iraq Contractors Convene in Tennessee, supra note 76. The stories
of these injured contractors are disturbing. One contractor, Preston Wheeler, was a truck driver
employed by Kellog, Brown, and Root (KBR) in Iraq who witnessed the murder of his coworker in 2005. Id. It took Mr. Preston two years to find a support group in which he could
begin to confront his emotional problems. Id. Another KBR employee, Robert Rho, was also
injured in Iraq and fought with his insurance carrier over benefits for years after his return.
Id. A third KBR contractor had to bring his case to the attention of Tennessee Senator
Lamar Alexander before receiving his DBA entitlements. See id. However, the most horrific
example of exploiting contractor veterans and their families is the case of Wade Dill. See
T. Christian Miller, The War's Quiet Scandal, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.thedaily
beast.comlblogs-and-storiesI2010-02-25/the-wars-quiet-scandaVfull. Mr. Dill accepted a job in
Mghanistan performing pest extermination services to help pay for his daughter'S college education. Id. On one occasion, Mr. Dill was called to clean up the remains of a young soldier who
had shot himself in the head. Id. The task had such a profound and disabling effect on Mr. Dill
that eventually Mr. Dill quit his job and separated from his wife. /d. On July 16,2006, Mr. Dill
was found dead in a local hotel room a few miles from their home. [d. He left a note that read,
"I did exist and I loved you." [d. His wife, Barbara Dill, filed a claim with KBR's insurance provider, AIG, claiming her husband's death was a result of PTSD brought on by his employment
in Iraq. /d. Her expert witness, Dr. Seaman, who specialized in PTSD, concluded that U[t)he
bottom line is that the combination of physical separation and work-related stress resulted in
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II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME

A. The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
the Deftnse Base Act, and the War Hazard Compensation Act
Congress is now debating alternatives to the regulatory scheme that protects contractors overseas,78 but the merits of these alternatives must be
weighed against current regulations. The Government provides workers'
compensation benefits to various categories of employees who perform
work for the Government. 79 In some cases, the Government provides
these benefits directly, with funds appropriated by Congress. 80 In other
cases, the Government mandates that contractors provide these benefits to
their employees. 81 Benefits are generally distributed based on one of four
employee types: military, civil service, nonappropriated fund instrumentality
(NFI), and contractor employees. 82
All members of the U.S. military are eligible to receive pay and benefits,
including pay and benefits for injuries, medical expenses, and life insurance
coverage. 83 Almost any injury or death of a military member while in active
status entitles the member to benefits, regardless of whether the member was
performing military duties when he or she was injured or killed. 84 Funding
for military benefits is provided through congressional appropriations to the
DoD, which oversees the Military Health System (MHS).85
Civilian employees, or "civil servants," are directly employed by the Government and receive compensation for work-related injuries under Title 5,
Chapter 81, of the United States Code. 86 The Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) provides funding for the benefits received by civil servants
increasingly emotional distance, greater distortion of the relationship, increasing emotional
intensity, and a pattern of increasing erratic behaviors that culminated in suicide .... " Id. However, the expert for AIG believed the illness was caused by marital and family problems and believed it was unrelated to the stresses of his employment in Iraq. !d. The DOL recommended
that AIG pay the claim, but AIG refused. Id. Ms. Dill's only recourse was to file an appeal
through DOL's dispute resolution system, a process that took months to complete. !d. She
eventually won her appeal in 2011, five years after her husband's death. See Dill v. Servo
Emps. Int'l, Inc., Case No. 2008-LDA-00259, at 43-44 (Dep't of Labor Jan. 21, 2011), available
at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/Decisions/ALJlLDAl2008IDILL_Barbara WID _v_SERVICE_EM
PLOYEES_IN_2008LDA002 59_ % 28JAN_2 1_20 II %29_I 34436_CADECSD.pdf.
78. See 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 19 (2009) (statement of Seth D. Harris, Deputy
Sec'y, Dep't of Labor).
79. See History of owep, u.s. DEP'T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PRO·
GRM1S, http://www.dol.gov/owcp/owcphist.htrn (last visited Jan. 14, 2012) (discussing various
workers' compensation programs administered by the Federal Government).
80. See, e.g., Federal Employees Workers' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.c. § 8102(a) (2006).
81. See, e.g., Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.c. § 904 (2006).
82. See 5 U.S.c. §8101 (2006) (civil service); 5 U.S.C. §8171(a) (2006) (NFl); 42 U.S.c.
§ 1651(a) (2006) (military and contractor employees).
83. See 10 U.s.c. § 1074(a)(I) (2006).
84. See id. § 1074(a)(2).
85. See RICHARD A. BEST JR., CONGo RESEARCH SERV., IB931 03, MILITARY MEDICAL CARE SERVICES: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS CRS-2 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/miscl
IB931 03. pdf.
86. See Compensation for Work Injuries,S U.S.c. §§ 8101-8152 (2006).
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covered by the statute. 87 The benefits are comprehensive and cover compensation for disability and death of employees,88 death gratuities for injuries in
connection with an employee's service with an armed force,89 and medical
services.
Compensation for injuries or death for NFl employees and contractors
is not directly paid for by appropriated funds. Rather, through various
amendments, Congress has directed that NFls and contractors provide benefits granted under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA) to their employees. 9o The LHWCA was enacted in 1927 and is
administered by the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP),
.under the DOL.91 As the title of the statute suggests, the LHWCA was originally intended to provide compensation for the disability or death of a maritime employee if the disability or death arose from an injury occurring upon
the navigable waters of the United States. 92 Through various amendments,
however, Congress has expanded the LHWCA to provide coverage to workers engaged in a wide range of public works projects,93 The statute requires
employers to provide coverage for qualifYing employees who are performing
work for the Government in certain areas. 94
The LHWCA contains benefits for many specific contingencies. Benefits
include medical services, supplies, and even choice of physician. 95 The statute also provides for disability and death benefits, depending on whether an
injury is permanent or temporary and whether the worker is partially or
totally disabled. 96 Typically, injured workers receive two-thirds of their average weekly wages for the duration of their disability.97 Congress has used the
LHWCA as the basic framework for providing workers' compensation benefits to government workers who are not directly employed by the Government, such as NFl employees. 98
87. This U.S. Treasury fund is a collection point for appropriations made by Congress for the
purpose of paying compensation and other benefits and expenses to eligible federal employees.
See Division of Federal Employee's Compensation (DFEC): Procedure Manual, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dfedprocedure-manual.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
88. 5 U.S.c. § 8102 (2006).
89. 5 U.S.c. § 8 102 (a) (Supp. II 2009).
90. See Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.c. §§ 901-950 (2006).
91. Division ofLongshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation (DLHWC): Pamphlet LS-560, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwdLS-560pam.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
92. 33 U.S.c. § 903(a).
93. 42 U.S.c. §§ 1651(a)(3), 1701(a) (2006).
94. See 33 U.S.c. § 904(a).
95. Id. § 907(a)-(b).
96. Id. § 908. Specific injuries are listed with particularity in the statute, such as "Compensation for loss of more than one phalange of a digit shall be the same as for loss of the entire digit.
Compensation for loss of the first phalange shall be one-half of the compensation for loss of the
entire digit." /d.
97. Id.
98. See Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities Act, 5 U.S.c. § 8171 (2006) (applying
LHWCA to NFl employees); 5 U.S.c. §2105(c) (2006) (describing NFl employees). DoD
uses NFls to maintain morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs and facilities for the
armed forces. Who Are NAP Employees?, CPMS.osD.MIL, http://www.cpms.osd.miIJASSETS/
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Workers' compensation for contractors operates much the same way. The
DBA extends coverage under the LHWCA by requiring government contractors to provide their employees with LHWCA benefits. 99 The DBA
was enacted in 1941 as a result of an almost tenfold increase in the use of
civilian contractors between World War I and World War II.lOO The purpose of the law was to clarify and limit the liability of the Government
and defense contractors while ensuring the protection of civilian laborers.lOl
Originally intended to cover only contractors working on military bases, the
DBA has been amended a number of times to provide expanded coverage for
contractors engaged in public work projects regardless of whether they work
on a military base. 102 The law requires businesses to provide compensation
in the event of injury or death to their employees working "at any military,
air, or naval base ... or upon lands occupied or used by the United States ...
or upon any public work ... outside the continental United States .... "103
The term "public work" is broadly defined in the statute and includes "any
project ... involving construction, alteration, removal or repair for the public use of the United States or its allies ... including service contracts ... and
ancillary work in connection therewith. . . . "104 Today, almost all U.S.
contractors working on building projects outside the continental United
States-such as dams, harbor improvements, roadways, and housing-are
covered under the DBA.lOS

87993068876A450DA03A6C76F6737D28IWho%20are%20NAF%20employees-ltem%200f
%20Interest.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2012). NFls are generally operated by civilians who are employed by the armed forces "services" sector and include operating post exchanges, child daycare centers, and indoor and outdoor recreation facilities under the jurisdiction of the armed
forces. Id. Due to their support role, NFl employees are often co-located with deployed forces.
Id. However, regardless of whether they are located inside or outside the continental United
States, NFl employees are covered by the LHWCA for work-related injuries. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 8171. The law that extends coverage under the LHWCA to NFl employees is the Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities Act (NFIA). Id. Under NFIA, benefits are paid for with revenues
generated by the NFls rather than appropriated funds. See Johnson v. United States, 600 F.2d
1218, 1221 (6th Cir. 1979); Who Are NAF Employees?, supra; James M. Mesnard, Exclusivity
Under the Act, 6 Loy. MAR. L.]. 59, 59 (2008).
99. See Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1651.
100. Greta S. Milligan, The Defense Base Act: An Outdated Law and Its Current Implications, 86
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407, 411 (2009) (85,000 civilians accompanied the military during
World War I, as compared to 734,000 in World War II).
101. 42 U.S.c. § 1651(a), (c) (2006). See generally Kerry]. Anzalone, The Defense Base Act-A
Growth Industry?, Benefits Rev. Bd. Serv., Longshore Rptr. (MB) (2004), available at http://www.
oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIC/LONGSHORE/REFERENCES/REFERENCE_WORKS/THE_
DEFENSE_BASE_ACT(2004).HTM.
102. See, e.g., War Hazards Compensation Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1701(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
103. Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1651(a)(3).
104. Id. § 1651(b)(1). In Casey v. Chapman College, 23 Ben. Rev. Bd. Servo (MB) 7, at 8, 10-11
(1989), the Board held that a professor of Asian Studies who was injured on a U.S. naval base in
Japan was covered under the DBA. The Board found that his employment teaching Asian studies
in the Pacific to Navy personnel was related to national defense and therefore constituted the
"public work" required for coverage. Id.
lOS. See Anzalone, supra note 101, at 1.
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Coverage under the DBA is monitored by the DOL, but the DOL does
not secure insurance for contractors. 106 The DBA requires contractors to
self-insure or purchase insurance with a provider of their choice. I07 The
DOL generates a list of prequalified DBA providers from which contractors
can choose.108 The cost of this insurance is allowable and allocable under
cost-type contracts. 109
A unique aspect of DBA insurance is coverage for injuries caused by acts
of war. The War Hazard Compensation Act (WHCA),IIO enacted in 1942,
provides compensation directly from the coffers of the Government in cases
of injury or death to employees resulting from a "war-risk hazard."111 Essentially, the Government self-insures when a contractor is injured by an act of
war. A war-risk hazard is defined in the statute and includes hazards caused
by the discharging of weapons or explosives by a hostile force,112 the operation of vessels or aircraft in a zone of hostilities or engaged in wartime activities,l13 or any action of a hostile force or person,114 including the detention of contractors by hostile forces. I IS By relieving insurance carriers from
the risk of insuring against injuries or death caused by war, the Government
intended to help contractors obtain DBA insurance at fair premiums. I 16
In summary, three basic insurance laws are implicated when contractors
employed by the Government are injured or killed overseas: (1) the
LHWCA, (2) the DBA, and (3) the WHCA.117 Two other laws, the Mutual
Security Act of 1954 and the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995, are also impli106. See Defense Base Act: Workers' Compensation for Employees of u.s. Government Contractors
Working Overseas, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwclExplainingDBAhtm
(last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
107. 42 U.S.c. § 1651(a)(4); see also Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33
U.S.c. § 932(a)(1)-<2) (2006).
108. Defense Base Act: Workers' Compensation for Employees of u.s. Government Contractors
Working Overseas, supra note 106, at 2.
109. FAR 31.205-19(c), (e)(2)(ii), (e)(2)(v) (2011).
110. War Hazard Compensation Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1701 (2006).
111. 20 C.F.R. § 61.100-.101 (2010). Reimbursement for injury or death is paid for with appropriated funds, similar to the payment of claims under the Federal Employees Compensation
Act (FECA). See Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.c. § 8147(a) (2006). An important caveat here is that, in most cases, insurance companies must pay WHCA claims up-front,
and may only be fully reimbursed if it is later shown that the injury or death was caused by a warrisk hazard. !d. (For the limited circumstances in which WHCA claims can be paid directly, see
20 C.F.R. § 61.105.) This system can create an incentive for carriers to initially deny claims. ld.
112. 42 U.S.c. § 1711(b)(I).
113. !d. § 1711(b)(5).
114. !d. § 1711(b)(2).
115. ld. § 1701.
116. Jeffrey L. Robb, Workers' Compensation for Defense Contractor Employees Accompanying the
Armed Forces, 33 PUB. CaNT. L.J. 423, 431 (2004) (citing S. REp. No. 77-1448, at 5 (1942».
117. Much like FECA, an exclusivity clause in the DBA limits employer liability to that of the
statute and excludes all other workers' compensation liability imposed by any state or other federal entity. See 5 U.s.c. § 8173 (2006). Thus, the DBA and accompanying laws provide the only
recourse for injured contractors. See id. ("This liability is exclusive and instead of all other liability of the United States ... in a civil action, or in admiralty, or by an administrative or judicial
proceeding under a workmen's compensation statute or under a Federal tort liability statute.");
Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1651(c) (2006).
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cated, but less frequently, as they apply to U.S. contractors under contract
with foreign governments. IIB Though these statutes have provided a satisfactory framework for protecting injured contractors in the past, the cost of
DBA insurance has become unacceptably high, as illustrated by the complaints congressional leaders have recently begun examining.
B. DBA Insurance Concerns: Rising Costs and Denial of Claims
The above compensation scheme was originally intended to provide
workers' compensation-type benefits to contractor employees and to limit
the liability of both the Government and defense contractors. Not surprisingly, Congress's concerns with the scheme today are still economically
driven, exacerbated by the unprecedented number of claims in the last
decade. 119 Congress simply never envisioned contractors working so closely
with military personnel for such protracted periods. It is anachronistic, however, to think the problems with DBA insurance are limited to issues of cost.
The denial and delayed processing of medical claims by insurance companies
have left many contractors without critical care. 120 Sadly, treatment for mental health care has been particularly susceptible to insurance carriers' heavyhanded denial of claims. 121
The Government has done a commendable job of creating an insurance
regulatory scheme for government contractors. The coverage, however,
comes at a high price. The rise in DBA insurance premiums is the primary
catalyst for recent congressional action. In The NDAA for 2009 included a
section in which Congress directed the DoD to address escalating costs of
DBA insurance. In The DoD undertook a nearly year-long study and
found that Congress's cost concerns were not unwarranted. 124 The DoD
found that between 2002 and 2008, the DBA insurance market grew from
about $18 million to more than $400 million in government premiums. 125
Comparing war zone and non-war zone premiums, the DoD found that
war zone premiums were ninety percent higher than non-war zone premiums. The DoD also found that eighty-eight percent of all premiums
118. See Mutual Security Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-665, 62 Stat. 850 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 22 U.S.c.); Dayton Peace Accords, Nov. 21, 1995, 35 LL.M. 75.
119. VALERIE BAlLEY GRASSO ET AL., CONGo RESEARCH SERV., RL34670, THE DEFENSE BASE
ACT (DBA): THE FEDERALLY MANDATED WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR OVERSEAS GovERNMENT CONTRACTORS 3 (2010).
120. T. Christian Miller & Doug Smith, Injured War Zone Contractors Fight to Get Care,
L.A. TL"'ES (Apr. 16, 2009, 10:25 PM), http://articies.latimes.coml2009lapr/17/nationinacontractors 17.
121. Id.
122. Defense Base Act Insurance: Are Taxpayers Paying Too Much?: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Oversight & Gov't Reform, IlOth Congo 30 (2008) (statement of Rep. Diane E. Watson) [hereinafter 2008 House Hearing].
123. See Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L.
No. 110-417, § 843, 122 Stat. 4502, 4540 (2008).
124. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at ii.
125. Id. at i.
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were for prime or subcontracts that had their primary place of performance
in Iraq and Mghanistan. 126 Perhaps not surprisingly, the high insurance premiums in war zones are a result of four major factors: (1) logistical challenges; (2) volatility in the workplace; (3) the volume of claims, including
controverted claims and subsequent litigation; and (4) a lack of competition
in the DBA insurance business. 127
The logistical challenges of providing DBA insurance are tremendous.
Iraq and Mghanistan lack adequate medical facilities, infrastructure, and
medical resources. 128 Routine injuries may require medical evacuation simply because the proper facilities or experts are not available. 129 Insurance carriers are often required to make reimbursements in different currencies, and
claims can involve parties or witnesses who speak different languages, have
different cultural norms, and are thousands of miles apart. 130 Such variables
result in increased costs, especially when a significant number of overseas
contractors have absolutely no presence in the United States. 131
Volatility in the workplace is another factor that creates high premiums.
DBA insurance involves more than paying benefits to injured workers; it is
the transferring of risk from employees to employers and insurance carriers.
Actuaries, employed by insurance carriers, analyze statistical data and use
mathematical formulas to derive risk probabilities for a multitude of loss scenariosp2 Carriers then use these calculations to set premiums to cover the
risk and to calculate what assets must be kept in reserve to pay for potential
10sses.l 33 Generally, actuaries must know (1) the chance that an event will
take place, (2) the amount of loss from the event, (3) the premium for
each category of policyholder, and (4) the amount that must be kept in
reserve to pay for the loss when the event occurS.134 If these data are accurate, insurance carriers can spread their risk across insureds in similar risk
"poOlS"135 so that losses can be shared over time.
The volatility of workplaces like Iraq and Mghanistan, with unstable governments, weak economies, and poor infrastructure, make actuarial calculations exceptionally difficult. Unlike the domestic workplace, employees
remain in-country for many months and do not leave their work environment except when taking leave.136 When employees do take leave, it often
126. !d. at 34.

127. See id. at 4-6; supra Part ILB.
128. See DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 4.
129. See id.

130. Id. at 5.
131. See 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 22 (statement of Seth Harris, Deputy Sec'y,
Dep't of Labor).
132. See Michelle E. Boardman, Knuwn Unknuwns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO.
LJ. 783, 810 (2005).
133. See id. at 809.
134. See id. at 813.
135. See id. at 809.
136. See generally DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARMY FIELD MANuAL 3-100.21, CONTRACTORS ON THE
BATTI.EFIELD Gan. 3, 2003).
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involves a precarious exit from the country.137 This unpredictability makes
estimating the costs associated with providing DBA insurance extremely
problematic. 138 Actuaries lack the extensive historical data on losses in
Iraq and Mghanistan that they do for losses in the domestic insurance market,139 as efforts to track injuries have only recently begun.l40 Thus, insurance carriers are likely to either underestimate or overestimate insurance
premiums. As a result, insurance carriers continue to front-load these risks
into premiums and insurance rates. 141
The DoD addressed the issue of excessive industry profits in its 2009
report to Congress. 142 The report stated plainly that DBA insurers were
achieving significant underwriting gains. 143 Relying on a 2008 memorandum, the DoD reported that the House Oversight and Government Reform
Committee had conducted a study and found that AIG had collected more
than $1.3 billion in premiums but had paid only $500 million in benefits,
a thirty-eight percent profit margin. l44 Likewise, an Army Audit Agency
report found that during the period from 2003 to 2005, Kellogg, Brown,
and Root (KBR) paid $284 million in premiums to AIG, but AIG was predicted to pay only $73 million for the care of KBR employees.1 45 It seems
providers of DBA insurance have protected themselves from volatility by
keeping premiums high and denying costly claims. 146
If there is any certainty concerning Iraq and Mghanistan, it is that troop
movements and rebuilding projects will remain volatile. As rebuilding projects wane, the civilian workforce will be withdrawn and DBA insurance premiums available to pay claims will decline. 147 Injured contractors, however,
are often younger than their domestic counterparts and may be entitled to

13 7. See generally id.
13S. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 24.
139. See DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 4.
140. SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 4.
141. Rebecca U. Weiner, The Hidden Costs of Contracting: Private Law, Commercial Imperatives and the Privatized Military Industry 22 (Dec. 200S) (unpublished paper), available at
htrp://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/fileslHidden%20Costs%20of<>1020Contracting_Dec%20200S
.pdf.
142. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 6.
143. !d.
144. Memorandum from the Majority Staff, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, 110th
Cong., to Members of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Congo 6 (May 15,
200S), available at http://abcnews.go.com/images/Blotter/DBA%20hearing%20_ %20200S0
515102024.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from the Majority Staff].
145. !d.
146. Despite these findings, the DoD does not place blame for the high cost of DBA insurance on rising profits. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 24. Rather, their report lists a number
of other factors, including broker commissions, sales and marketing, and other administrative
costs, as contributing factors. See id. Congress, on the other hand, has expressed greater concern
over the exorbitant profits. See generally id. This tension is partly what has framed the debate
between the DoD and Congress on how DBA insurance should be secured in the future. See generally id.
147. Miller & Smith, supra note 120.
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reimbursements for injuries well into the future. 148 For this reason, insurance companies are extremely cognizant of the number and type of claims
they will pay and the effect of such payments on their revenue after their premium streams decline. 149
The rising number of claims has also contributed to higher premiums. In
2008, the escalating number of claims forced the Division of Longshore and
Harbors Workers' Compensation (DLHWC), which oversees the processing of all DBA claims, to restructure its claims processing. ISO DLHWC divided all Middle East DBA claims, previously processed through its New
York City office, among its ninety-seven employees located in eleven different district offices.1Sl The increase in the volume of claims has raised costs
for both industry and the Government. 152
While the volume of claims has driven premium rates higher, controverted claims and claims in litigation also have contributed to rising rates.
Under the LHWCA, an insurance carrier (or employer, if the employer is
self-insured) has fourteen days from the date of notification of the injury
to make payment to the employee. l53 Given this short period of time, costly
claims or those involving more complex issues, such as PTSD, are often
"controverted."IS4 Insurance carriers will typically hire their own experts
to examine records and documents, even though an employee's physician
has already made a diagnosis and recommendation for treatment. ISS This situation usually results in conflicting expert testimony, causing lengthy delays
in claims processing.156
Controverted claims involving WHCA reimbursements also have contributed to inefficiencies in the claims processing system resulting in tremendous economic waste. Under the WHCA, insurance carriers are not reimbursed for war-risk hazards until the insurance carrier pays the insured's
DBA claim.1S7 The DOL issued a bulletin to insurance carriers strongly

148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ANNuAL
REpORT TO CONGRESS FY 2008, at 2-3 (2008), available at http://www.dol.gov/owcp/080
wcprnx.pdf.
151. Id. at 31.
152. See id. at 33.
153. See 33 U.S.c. §914(b) (2006).
154. 20 C.F.R. § 702.251 (2011).
155. See 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 182.
156. Uncertainty in the U.S. courts of appeals regarding the correct judicial forum for appeals
under the DBA has only extended the litigation of these claims. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits have concluded that appeals should begin in the district courts, while the
Ninth Circuit has held that appeals from the DOL's administrative process should be heard
by courts of appeals. See Claire Been, Bypassing Redundancy: Resolving the Jurisdictional Dilemma
Under the Defense Base Act, 83 WASH. L. REv. 219 (2008); see also Heather Ruhlman, Service Employees International v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs: Increasing the
Uncertainty Regarding the Proper Courts for Jurisdictional Review of Claims Under the Defense Base
Act, 44 CREIGHTON L. REv. 769 (2011).
157. 20 C.F.R. § 61.101 (2011).
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recommending that carriers obtain a compensation order delineating the insured's entitlement to benefits, the rate of compensation, and the period of
payment, even before submitting a WHCA reimbursement request. 15S An
insurance carrier, therefore, must payor dispute a claim well before a reimbursement determination is ever made. This creates an incentive for insurance carriers to deny potential WHCA claims until they can obtain an
administrative law judge order expressly finding that the injury resulted
from a war-risk hazard. Once an insurance carrier obtains an ALJ order, it
can better support its WHCA reimbursement claim. 159 This method of disputing claims wastes government and industry resources and inflates the cost
of the dispute process.
Lack of competition also has contributed to increased premiums. In the
NDAA for 2009, Congress asked the secretary of defense to develop an acquisition strategy for DBA insurance that would minimize costs to the DoD and
defense contractors and "provide for a competitive marketplace ... to the
maximum extent practicable."160 Competition, however, has not been a hallmark of procuring DBA insurance. In fact, on August 8, 2003, shortly after
the invasion of Iraq, the DoD solicited proposals to provide DBA insurance
under a "single-provider" DoD-wide program. 161 The solicitation was left
open for almost a month, but not a single insurance carrier submitted a
proposal. 162
Two other agencies, however, have had more success soliciting singleprovider insurance for their agencies. The DOS and the u.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) have used single-provider programs
for some time. 163 Under this system, rather than securing their own insurance, contractors are required to use an insurance carrier selected through
competitive procurement procedures. '64 While this strategy has been successful in the past, the DOS and USAID have recently struggled to generate
competition for DBA insurance contracts. 165 When the DOS and USAID
most recently issued DBA insurance proposals for their respective agencies,
only one insurance carrier, CNA, offered a proposal.I 66 Single-provider
competition for DBA insurance for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
158. OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPo PROGRAMS, OWCP BULLETIN No. 05-01, WAR HAzARD
COMPENSATION ACT-CLAIMS FOR REIMBURSEMENT & DETENTION BENEFIT PROCEDURES (2005),
available at http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dfedregs/complianceIDFECFolio/OWCPBulletin05-01.
pdf.
159. 20 C.F.R. § 61.101(c) (2011) lists items that must be provided to receive reimbursement.
160. Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No.
110-417, § 843(b)(5), 122 Stat. 4502,4540 (2008).
161. Vernon Silver, Bloomberg, Bechtel Benefits as Iraq Contractors Struggle to Get Insurance,
SAN DIEGO SOURCE (Nov. 25, 2003), http://www.sddt.comlNews/articie.cfm?SourceCode=
20031125faj.
162. Id.
163. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 7.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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(USACE) met the same result, receiving only one proposal from CNA in a
recent competition. 167
Even when contractors secure their own DBA insurance on the open market, three major carriers dominate the marketplace. Out of the thirty-two
carriers that provide DBA insurance, AIG, CNA, and ACE account for
ninety-seven percent of all the premiums collected. 168 Twenty-nine carriers
make up the additional three percent. 169 AIG alone accounts for seventy-five
percent of the total DBA insurance policy premiums. 170 Due to lack of competition, a business in which a single company controls the lion's share of the
market can be very costly. Further, when claims processing problems arise,
claimants and contracting agencies have a much harder time lobbying for
changes because of the money and influence on the other side of the debate.
A second major concern, almost completely overlooked by the Government and industry, is that claimants are too often being denied reimbursement for medical treatment. A problem that existed early in the days of
the Iraq invasion, which unbelievably is still a problem today, is that employers simply fail to secure DBA insuranceY1 When the Iraq war began in
March 2003, contractors were woefully ignorant of the DBA's requirements. l72 Employees were often sent to work in war zones without workers'
compensation insurance. 173 The chronicles of contractors' missteps in this
area in the early days of the Iraq war are ghastly. 174
The Army was aware that contracts were being awarded without the required DBA clause because the Defense Acquisition Excellence Council
briefed the issue at a March 18,2003, council meeting.J75 One of the presenters, Alan Chvotkin, specifically informed the council that DBA coverage was
167. /d.
168. /d. at 28.
169. /d.
170. Id. at 29.
171. See Susie Dow, Iraq, Contingency Contracting, and the Defense Base Act, EPLURIBUSMEDIA.
ORG, http://www.epluribusmedia.org/featuresl200712007 03 04_contingency_contracting.html (last
visited Mar. 4, 2012).
172. .See id.
173. See id.
174. Susie Dow, a contributor for ePluribus Media, maintains a blog documenting the tragedy of Kirk Von Ackerman and Ryan Manelick, two former U.S. Air Force officers who were
killed in Iraq. Susie Dow & Steven Reich, One Missing, One Dead: An Iraq Contractor in the
Fog of War, EpLURIBUSMEDIA.ORG (May 12, 2006), http://www.epluribusmedia.orglfeatures/
2006120060512_missingman_p1.html. The two men were hired to work for Ultra Services, an
Army contractor in Istanbul, Turkey. Id. On October 9,2003, Von Ackerman left Forward Operating Base (FOB) Pacesetter near Balad, Iraq, and was never seen again. /d. Two months later,
Ryan Manelick, his co-worker, was shot to death in his vehicle after leaving a meeting at Camp
Anaconda at Balad Air Base. Id. The Army was not able to determine whether the deaths were
related. /d. Von Ackerman left behind a wife and three children. Id. After his disappearance, his
wife filed a claim for compensation under the DBA. Id. However, Ultra Services had not secured
DBA insurance for Von Ackerman or Manelick. Id. In fact, company executives said they had
never heard of DBA insurance even though they had collected revenues of more than $12 million in government contracts. Id.; see also Dow, mpra note 171.
175. Michael]. Dudley, Contractors on the Battlefield: Part III, DCMA CO,\1MUNICATOR, Fall
2004-Winter 2005, at 28, 33.
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being overlooked and contracts were being awarded without DBA coverage. 176 Mr. Chvotkin stated that due to some Contracting Officers' (COs)
lack of familiarity with DBA requirements, the urgency with which the
DoD was awarding contracts in Iraq, and confusion over the scope of
DBA clauses, the DBA clauses were often omitted from many overseas contracts. ln Even after the Army recognized the problem, accurate information
was still not reaching COs and defense contractors. For example, two years
later, in November 2005, contractor Wolfpack Security, Inc. denied that it
was responsible for securing DBA insurance after an injured employee
incurred $700,000 in medical expenses. 178
It is difficult to believe that the DoD simply needs more time to communicate DBA requirements to the field. These requirements have been in
effect since 1941. 179 While contractors' roles have changed since that
time, contractors have been intimately involved in the war effort since
Gulf War I in 1991. 180 During a June 18,2009, House Committee hearing,
the former deputy secretary of the Department of Labor flatly stated that
"the DOL is limited in its ability to guarantee that all employers have the
necessary insurance as there is no comprehensive system for tracking overseas contracts, contractors, and subcontractors, and workers under each contract."181 He went on to say that it is sometimes difficult for the DOL to even
identify the employer, the prime contractor, and the responsible insurance carrier
with overseas contracts, and that some contractors simply go without insurance to
lower their costs. 182 In other words, keeping track of contractors has simply

confounded the Government.
Contractors' failure to secure DBA insurance has been further complicated by ambiguities in the DBA and associated statutes. Generally, the language in the DBA is broad, covering "any employee engaged in any employment ... upon any public work in any Territory or possession outside the
continental United States ... if such employee is engaged in employment
at such place under the contract of a contractor . . . with the United

176. Dow, supra note 171.
177. See id.
178. See T. Christian Miller, Forgotten Warriors: Russell Skoug's Story, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 16,
2009, 10:25 PM), http://www.propublica.org/articlelforgotten-warriors-russell-skougs-story416. On September 11, 2006, Mr. Skoug was ttaveling with an Anny Special Forces unit
when their convoy ran over an anti-tank mine. Id. Mr. Skoug survived, due in part to his bulletproof vest and the annor-plated truck. Id. The president of Wolfpack, Mark Atwood, acknowledged that a number of mistakes had been made with respect to Mr. Skoug's injuries but denied
his company was required to secure DBA insurance for its employees. Id. Mr. Atwood claimed
that Wolfpack's contract with the Anny did not require DBA insurance and that the Anny
should never have allowed Mr. Skoug to travel with an Anny Special Forces convoy. Id.
179. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39.
180. See Stephen Lendman, Outsourcing War-Rise of Private Military Contractors (PMCs),
RENSE.COM (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.rense.comlgeneraI89/outs.htm.
181. 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 23 (statement of Seth Harris, Deputy Sec'y, Dep't
of Labor).
182. Id.
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States."183 Another clause in particular, however, excludes coverage to any
contractor or subcontractor "who is engaged exclusively in furnishing materials or supplies under his contract."184 This limitation serves multiple purposes. First, it excludes manufacturers of goods used overseas. 18S Second, it
removes some of the insurance risk by excluding contractors who move in
and out of the area of responsibility (AOR).186 Risk for these workers may
be difficult to determine since the amount of time these contractors spend
in the AOR, and the areas in which they travel, might vary greatly depending
on the contract. Further, depending on where they work, many of these
manufacturers or suppliers may not require DBA insurance. The exclusion
therefore reduces the overall cost of insurance for the Government.
This exclusion of supply contractors, however, has created a great deal of
ambiguity. For example, a contractor might manufacture materials or supplies in the United States but also deliver the supplies to the AOR. Delivery
of supplies to the AOR might require employees to perform onsite services.
The contractor would seem to be exempt from DBA requirements as he is
"exclusively engaged in furnishing material and supplies,"187 but employees
making deliveries to the AOR or performing onsite services might bring the
contractor within the scope of the statute. The nuances in the law are difficult enough for U.S. contractors to comprehend, let alone less sophisticated
second- and third-tier contractors who may have no familiarity with U.S.
law.
Further complicating the matter, DoD agencies seem to disagree on when
DBA insurance is required. 188 In an effort to explain the exception to the
clause, former Director for Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy
Deidre A. Lee issued a memorandum to the directors of the defense
agencies, explicitly stating that the DBA clause should be included in all
DoD service contracts performed (either entirely or in part) outside of the
183. Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1651(a)(3) (2006).
184. Id.
185. See Alan-Howard v. Todd Logistics, Inc., 21 Ben. Rev. Bd. Servo (MB) 70, 72-73 (1988).
In this case, the Board held that the administrative assistant's claim for injury was cognizable
under the DBA since the U.S. undertaking to aid in the construction of a military facility for
Saudi Arabia qualified as the "public work" required for coverage under the DBA. Id. Furthermore, the DBA exclusion from coverage of "any employee of ... [aJ contractor ... who is
engaged exclusively in furnishing materials or supplies under his contract" was held not to
apply since the claimant's work as a facilitator under his employer's contract to provide "logistics
management and support services" constituted a "service." Id. Specifically, the Board viewed the
pertinent exclusionary language as excluding manufacturers of goods used overseas from DBA
coverage, rather than individuals who work onsite to facilitate the utilization of such goods. Id.
186. See Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1651.
187. Id. § 1651(a)(3).
188. See USACE Defense Base Act Insurance Program, Workers Compo I7lS. Program Rules & Regulations, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, http://www.tam.usace.arrny.miVDocumentslIndustry
DayDocslDefense-Base-Act-Insurance.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers explicitly requires DBA insurance unless a waiver is obtained). But see OFFICE OF TIlE
AsSISTANT SEC'y OF THE ARMY, ARMY CONfRACroRS ACCOMPANYING TIlE FORCE GUIDEBOOK 18
(2003), tlVailable at http://www.alt.arrny.miVportal/pageiportal/oasaaltidocurnentslcaf...guidebook.
doc (stating that DBA insurance "is available" in some instances).
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United States, as well as in all supply contracts that also require the peiformance of
employee services overseas. 189 The authority Ms. Lee cited for this expansive
reading of the DBA rests on the broad definition of the term "public-work
contract" in FAR 28.305. 190 The memorandum essentially dispenses with
the "service" versus "supply" distinction that the exemption language in
the statute seems to impose. 191
A 2005 GAO report was critical of the DoD's confusing guidance related
to the applicability of DBA insurance.t92 The GAO found that some
agencies believed DBA insurance waivers issued by the DOL exempted contractors working in Iraq from carrying DBA insurance. 193 DOL officials,
however, confirmed that waivers do not apply to contractors in Iraq because
the country lacks its own local workers' compensation system. 194 The report
also raised questions about what benefits would be provided when grant
workers purchase DBA insurance, since the DOL position is that DBA requirements do not cover work performed under grants. 195 Lastly, the report
raised concerns over whether DBA insurance would be required for mixedfunding contracts involving appropriated funds of the United States and
funds from foreign governments. 196
The DBA clause's lack of clarity may have reduced the Government's
willingness to impose sanctions on contractors failing to secure DBA insurance. The DOL and the Department of Justice's (DO]) refusal to enforce
DBA laws has done nothing to raise awareness of the importance of DBA
insurance. Criminal and civil penalties are available to the Government
when contractors either fail to obtain DBA insurance or fail to comply
with the DOL's administrative processing regulations. 197 The Government,
however, has no incentive to impose these sanctions and has only rarely
elected to do so. The DOL may impose civil fines in the amount of
$10,000 against an employer, insurance carrier, or self-insured employer
who knowingly and willfully fails to notify the DOL when an employee is
injured and the injury causes the employee to miss one or more shifts
from work. 198 Likewise, the DOL may impose civil penalties on contractors
who make false statements in their DOL reports. 199 Between 2001 and 2009,
189. Memorandum from Deidre A. Lee, Director, Def. Procurement & Acquisition Policy,
Office of the Under Sec'y of Def., to the Directors of the Def. Agencies (Dec. 8, 2003), available
at https:llwww.alt.army.millportal/page/portalloasaaltldocuments/dpap_memo_08dec03.pdf
(emphasis added).

190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-OS -280R, DEFENSE BASE ACT INSURANCE:
REVIEW NEEDED OF COST AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 5 (2005).
193. See id.
194.Id.
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. 20 C.F.R. § 702.204 (2011).
198. Id. § 702.201 (2011).
199. Id. § 702.204.
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however, the DOL only fined five companies, even though DOL records
showed at least 7,000 cases where companies had failed to report injuries. 2oo
As of June 2009, the DOL reported levying fines in only about 50 of the
36,000 cases processed by the two largest insurance companies. 201
Criminal sanctions are also authorized under the LHWCA, yet no one has
ever been prosecuted. When contractor conduct triggers the possibility of criminal penalties, the LHWCA requires the DOL to alert the DO] as the DO]
maintains prosecutorial discretion. 202 The LHWCA's language is clear and
expansive in terms of imposing criIninal penalties on companies and individual
company officers. 203 The section states that employers failing to obtain DBA
insurance, when required, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and may be fined
up to $10,000 and imprisoned for up to a year, or both. 204 Additionally, the section provides that in cases where such an employer is a corporation, the president, secretary, and treasurer shall be severally liable for the corporation's failure to secure DBA insurance. 205 In fact, the statute provides that the president,
secretary, and treasurer shall be "severally personally liable, jointly with such
corporation, for any compensation or other benefit which may accrue under
the said Act in respect to any injury which may occur to any employee of
such corporation.... "206 This broad language suggests that Congress wanted
to ensure that contractor employees were adequately covered under the DBA.
Given the severe consequences, one would expect that they would deter contractors from failing to provide DBA insurance. In the nearly eighty-five-year
history of the LHWCA, however, no one has ever been prosecuted. 207
Even when contractors do secure DBA insurance, carriers still deny liability for many claims related to PTSD and other serious injuries. There is no
question that the regulatory scheme has been overburdened by a heightened
reliance on contractors. 20B This excuse, however, fails to justify the delay and
denial of mental health claims. Critics of the current DBA regulatory scheme
argue that the DOL does not have the necessary authority to properly oversee the compensation system and, therefore, has limited ability to correct the
delay and denial of mental health claims under DBA insurance. 209
The statistics for mental health DBA claims are dismal. Three insurance
carriers account for approximately ninety-seven percent of the DBA premiums paid by the DoD.21O AIG accounts for approximately seventy-five
200. See T. Christian Miller, Injured Abroad, Neglected at HlJ'I1te: Labor Dept. Slow to Help War
Zone Contractors, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.propublica.org/articlellabor-deptslow-to-enforce-defense-base-act-for-contractor-care-1217.
201. See id.
202. Id.
203. See 33 U.S.c. § 938(a) (2006).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Miller, supra note 200.
208. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 192, at 3.
209. See Schooner & Swan, Dead Contractors, supra note 28, at 24-26.
210. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39.
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percent, while CNA and ACE Group account for approximately fourteen
percent and seven percent, respectively.211 However, these numbers are
somewhat misleading. Chris Winans, a spokesman for AIG, said his company pays about half of the claims involving PTSD.212 A joint investigation
by the Los Angeles Times, ABC News, and ProPublica found that when injuries resulted in more than four days of lost work, insurance carriers also paid
claims in only about half the cases. 213
The media have helped raise awareness about the denial of mental health
claims. 214 Because insurance carriers rarely confront significant consequences for such denials, however, an exorbitant number of injured contractors must challenge their carriers' refusal to pay their claims. 215 The hardship imposed on contractors when their claims are denied is an important
part of the debate surrounding DBA insurance. 216 Any alternative for a
new acquisition strategy must provide the DOL with more oversight authority; otherwise, insurance carriers will continue to exploit injured contractors.
III. DEVELOPING A NEW ACQUISITION STRATEGY

A. Policy Changes Could Alleviate Existing Problems
The acquisition process must be reformed. But before making any statutory changes, Congress should consider whether policy changes would
alleviate its cost concerns. Three particular policy considerations should
be addressed. First, the DoD should consider the benefits associated with
211. Id.
212. Risen, supra note 10.
213. See Miller & Smith, supra note 120.
214. See Russell Goldman, How Iraq Contractors Deal with Trauma, ABC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2007),
http://abcnews.go.comlUS/story?id=3679866&page=1; see also Miller, supra note 200; Max Pizarro, One Widow's Drive to End the War, CLATL.COM (Jan. 24, 1007), http://clad.comladanta/
one-widows-drive-to-end-the-war/Content?oid=1265285 [hereinafter Pizarro, Drive to End the
War]. The investigation by the Los Angeles Times, ABC News, and ProPublica highlighted the
accounts of three contractors, Alice Davis, John Mancini, and Tim Eysselinck, who were denied
reimbursement for mental health treatment. Alice Davis was hired by DynCorp International to
train police officers in Iraq. Goldman, supra. As a result of her exposure to dead bodies, children
without limbs, and life-threatening situations, Ms. Davis developed seizures. Id. DynCorp recommended she seek mental health treatment, but their insurance carrier refused to reimburse
her treatment. Id. John Mancini was hit by an SUV on his way home from Kuwait City. His
employer had failed to secure DBA insurance. Miller, supra note 200. Mr. Mancini sought reimbursement for his medical bills for two years through DOL, without success. Id. On October 6,
2006, Mr. Mancini was arrested after making several calls to the police and shooting a gun at
officers when they arrived at his house. ld. He was sentenced to ten years in an Arizona
mental hospital, followed by treatment through the Arizona correctional system. Id. Lasdy,
Tim Eysselinck, a forty-four-year-old contractor employee for RONCO Consulting Corporation (RONCO), was hired to provide land mine and explosive ordnance removal services.
Pizarro, Drive to End the War, supra. On April 21, 2004, Tim Eysselinck shot himself while
on leave with his wife and daughter in Africa after celebrating his forty-fourth birthday. /d.
His employer denied the family's DBA claim, stating that Mr. Eysse!inck's suicide was unrelated
to his de-mining duties in Iraq. ld.
215. See Memorandum from the Majority Staff, supra note 144, at 15.
216. See Milligan, supra note 100, at 416-17.
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paying a reasonable amount of money for DBA insurance. Second, if the cost
associated with maintaining a healthy contactor workforce is too high, Congress should consider whether civilian contractors should be working in war
zones at all. Third, if contractors are needed in war zones, the DoD should
consider enforcing existing regulations to reduce the cost of DBA insurance.
Insuring contractors in war zones is costly.217 Although Congress wants
to reduce the cost of DBA insurance, it must consider that paying too little
for insurance might circumvent a number of important goals. First, the quality of service provided by insurance carriers is already reaching unacceptable
levels for mental health claims. 2ls Reducing costs before these issues are resolved will only exacerbate the problems. Second, the law requires contractors to provide for the health and safety of their employees at the work
site. 219 Since the Government reimburses contractors for insurance premiums, it is reasonable that the Government should be concerned with benefits distribution. If insurance companies are denying claims and reaping
excessive profits, then the Government is complicit in circumventing the
DBA. Third, the Government must provide for a safe working environment
to keep contractors from straying from the Government's objectives. Like
insurance carriers, contractor employees are agents of the Government. If
employees are not receiving reimbursement for care, their families' financial
security is at risk. 220 A contractor in this position will always put his or her
own objectives over the objectives of the Government. Thus, before any
cheaper means of securing DBA benefits is implemented, Congress must
realize that DBA insurance is costly and that paying less for insurance is
not necessarily in the best interest of the Government.
If cost is Congress's primary concern-as the NDAA for 2009 seems to
suggest-then the Government should consider relying less on civilians in
war zones. Simply stated, the Government should not send civilians to war
zones if they are not willing to pay the costs associated with ensuring their
safety. No matter what acquisition strategy is used, the cost of insuring
against risk to contractors in war zones will be costly. If Congress has
decided that the United States can no longer afford these costs, then perhaps
the work should be left to the U.S. military. Ordinarily, the Government
would use its military to perform hazardous tasks. Yet because of the personnellimits imposed by Congress, much of the risk of performing services and
construction in war zones has been allocated to contractors. 221 It is simply
not acceptable that Congress take any action that threatens the safety of

U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, mpra note 192, at 3-4.
Goldman, mpra note 214.
Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1651(a)(4) (2006).
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., PUB. No. 09-POll, MENTAL HEALTH: REsEARCH FINDINGS 5 (2009).
221. See CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR DEPLOYED MILITARY FORCES 2-5
(2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocsl67xx1doc6794/1O-20-MilitaryLogisticsSupport.pdf.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See
See
See
See
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contractors after they have borne the responsibilities the DoD has placed on
them. Ill-equipping the warfighter because of cost concerns should never be an
acceptable solution, regardless of whether the warfighter is enlisted, commissioned,
or under contract with the U.S. Government.

Lastly, a new acquisition strategy will not necessarily alleviate existing
problems or decrease costs unless current regulations are enforced. Better
enforcement of existing regulations is a low-cost solution, which requires
no implementation. Criminal penalties are already available under the
LHWCA if contractors fail to secure DBA insurance. 222 Further, the
DOL has the authority to levy fines when contractors fail to purchase
DBA-required insurance 223 and the DO] has the authority to prosecute
and imprison delinquent contractors. 224 Although these remedies are available, few fines have ever been assessed and no one has ever been prosecuted
for failing to carry DBA insurance. 225 If the Government used these remedies, it would at least improve contractor compliance with the law, and perhaps send a stronger message regarding the importance of DBA insurance.
Another mechanism already in place that could be used to monitor DBA
compliance is the CO's responsibility determination. The FAR mandates
that no contract shall be awarded unless the CO makes an affirmative determination of responsibility.226 While these determinations typically involve a
contractor's financial stability, the clause states that contractors must be
"otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an award."227 Since failing to
secure DBA insurance carries criminal penalties, it would seem the clause
is broad enough to allow COs to find contractors nonresponsible when
they fail to secure DBA insurance.
Given the DBA clause's broad language, it also seems reasonable that the
responsibility determination could be used to ensure that contractor employees are physically capable of performing contract requirements. The military
imposes rigorous physical standards. 228 It makes sense that their civilian
counterparts, who often work closely with the military, are also physically
prepared for the operational hazards of their jobs.
Requiring contractors to maintain fitness standards could provide a number of advantages to insurance carriers and the Government. First, with a
healthier pool of claimants, the number of claims, as well as the cost of
each claim, might be reduced. Second, liability might be clearer with claimants who have fewer preexisting conditions, thus reducing litigation costs.
222. 33 U.S.c. § 938(a) (2006).
223. 20 C.F.R. § 702.201 (2011).
224. 33 U.S.c. § 938(a).
225. Miller, supra note 200.
226. FAR 9.1 03 (b).
227. FAR 9.104-1(g).
228. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PHYSICAL FITNESS TRAINING FM 21-20 (1998), available at http://www.apft.netIFM21-20.pdf.U.S.DEP·TOFTHENAvy.GUIDE 5: PHYSICAL READINESS
TEST (pR1), available at http://www.public.navy.millbupers-npcJsupportiphysicalldocuments/
guide%205-physical%20readiness%20test.pdf.
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Overall, requiring contractors to provide employees that are physically capable of performing their jobs would likely make insuring these workers less
risky and less costly.
Although enforcing existing regulations would improve efficiency, the
breadth of available remedies is somewhat limited. The Government may
only impose sanctions or penalties authorized under the DBA and associated
statutes. 229 While the sanctions are significant, they are limited to compliance failures-situations in which the contractor failed to obtain insurance. 230 The sanctions do not directly address cost and performance con-'
cerns. 231 Further, because the Government has no privity of contract with
insurance carriers, its remedies against carrier malfeasance are limited to
those provided by the statute. Employers may seek remedies for breach of
contract against insurance carriers when their employees' claims are denied,
but they have no incentive to do so. Therefore, absent action from either the
Government or their employers, contractor employees are left with only limited procedural remedies against insurance carriers.
In summary, the DoD must accept that there are costs associated with
keeping contractors safe overseas. If the cost is too high, then perhaps civilians should be removed from the front lines. If contractors are needed in
war zones, then the Government should make a more valiant effort to
enforce current regulations. While the Government still needs to implement
improved acquisition strategies for DBA insurance, enforcement of current
regulations will improve efficiency, will provide better care for contractors,
and may even slow the rising number of contractor casualties.

B. Single-Provider Insurance versus Open-Market Insurance:
A Forty-Year Debate

The Government has been pursuing DBA insurance reform since the
1970s, when the GAO released two reports expressing their concern over
the cost and implementation of DBA insurance. 232 Since that time, the
debate has mainly focused on whether the DoD would realize greater cost
savings by implementing a single-insurer program, such as the DOS and
the USAID programs,233 or through improvements to the current open229. See Jeffrey L. Robb, The Future of Competitive Sourcing: Workers' Compensation for Defense
Contractor Employees Accompanying the Armed Forces, 33 PUB. Com. L.J. 423, 425 n.18, 426 n.24
(2004) (noting that the DBA incorporates the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act as a statute of general reference and that under the LHWCA, an employer who fails to
secure the payment of compensation is guilty of a misdemeanor offense) (citing 33 U.S.c.
§ 938(a) (2000».
230. See 33 U.S.c. § 938(a) (2006).
231. See id.
232. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-I72699, OPPORTUNITY FOR SAVINGS IN PROVIDING WAR RISK INSURANCE FOR CONfRACTOR PROPERTY AND EMPLOYEES (1971), available
at http://archive.gao.gov/ID302l095484.pdf; see also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
B-162408, AID NEEDS CLARIFICATION ON DEFENSE BASE ACT INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
(1980), available at http://archive.gao.gov/ID202l113660.pdf.
233. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 7.
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market program. In 1996, the DoD completed a congressionally mandated
study, similar to DoD's most recent DBA report to Congress, on the issue
of implementing a single-provider program to provide DBA insurance for
all DoD contracts. 234 At the time, the DoD concluded that a single-provider
program would not yield greater cost savings. 235 The Government rested on
those findings until 2005, when smaller federal agencies, such as the DOS
and USAID, began realizing cost savings using single-provider programs.
The debate between Congress and the DoD over DBA acquisition procedures subsequently intensified.
In 2005, the GAO performed a comprehensive study of DBA insurance and
found that both the DOS and USAID were realizing cost savings through fixed
insurance rates under single-provider contracts. 236 At the same time, the cost of
DBA insurance on the open market was steadily rising and the DoD was experiencing unprecedented cost increases. 237 In April 2005, in response to requests
from over 100 members of Congress, the GAO issued a report on rising costs
and other problems associated with DBA insurance. 238 The crux of the report
was whether greater savings could be obtained from a single-provider or an
open-market provider system. 239 The GAO found that contractors working
for the DOS and USAID paid insurance premiums ranging from $2 to $5 for
DBA insurance for every $100 of salary cost-regardless of where the contract
was performed. 240 In contrast, DoD insurance premiums ranged from $10 to
$21 per $100 of salary cost for contracts performed in Iraq.241 The GAO concluded that while singe-provider programs appeared to be more cost-efficient,
further information was needed to determine whether the DoD could achieve
the same rates and savings as the DOS and USAID given the locations in
which it operates.242
The GAO also cited multiple problems with the DoD's administration of
DBA insurance, preventing a conclusion as to whether a single-provider
strategy would result in costs similar to those experienced by the DOS
and USAID.243 The GAO found that the DoD experienced problems with
(1) determining when DBA insurance applies, (2) providing adequate and
accurate information to companies and workers, (3) monitoring contractor
compliance with DBA requirements, (4) processing claims, and (5) handling
the increased claims volume. 244 The GAO concluded that an informed deci234. See U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNfABILITY OFFICE, supra note 192, at 5.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 3.
238. See U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNfABILITY OFFICE, supra note 192, at 5.
239. See id. at 4.

240. DBA insurance costs are typically compared in terms of dollars per $100 of payroll cost.
241. See U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNfABILITY OFFICE, supra note 192, at 4. The GAO contacted eight
prime contractors who reported these rates.
242. See id. at 5.
243. See generally id.
244. See id.
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sion about a procurement strategy for DBA insurance could not be made
until these shortcomings were corrected. 245 Further, the GAO recommended that the DoD, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the
DOL, the DOS, and USAID conduct a joint study in order to gather as
much data as possible on DBA insurance and to determine which acquisition
strategy would be most effective across the agencies.246
Both the OMB and the DoD objected to the recommendation. The OMB believed that efforts to rectify the problems were already in place. 247lt cited the formation of an interagency working group, DOL seminars on DBA insurance, a
proposed DOS rule regarding D BAinsurance waivers, and an ongoing pilot program to test the efficiency of single-provider insurance for the DoD.248 The
OMB also stated that the GAO's recommendation was too broad and that a "targeted approach to DBA issues would be preferable.... "249
Likewise, the DoD stated that the cost of such a study would outweigh
any potential benefits. 250 The DoD added that the cost of DBA data collection and reporting would be expensive and divert already limited resources,
with no clear benefit for the procurement process. 251 The DoD recommended waiting to see if the working group, seminars, conferences, and
pilot program could achieve their desired results before undertaking any further studies. 252
Despite the DoD's reluctance, Congress directed the DoD to examine
reform strategies for DBA insurance in its National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2006. 253 Two years later, the DoD still had not acted
on Congress's request. 254 During a May 2008 House Oversight and Government Reform Committee hearing, the Committee railed against Admiral
Richard Ginman (Ret. U.S. Navy), Deputy Director for Contingency
Contracting and Acquisition Policy, for not being able to provide answers
to simple and germane questions. 255
The Committee asked Admiral Ginman and other senior officials at DoD
and DOL (1) how many contractors and subcontractors are in Iraq,256
(2) how much the DoD pays to insure them/ 57 (3) if all contractors in
Iraq require DBA insurance/ 58 (4) how insurance rates are determined,
245. See id. at 6.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. !d. at 9.
249. !d.
250. Id. at 11.
251. Id.
252. !d.
253. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, 119
Stat. 3136 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.c.).
254. GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at 18.
255. See 2008 House Hearing, supra note 122, at 92.
256. !d. at 100.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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and (5) how much contractors pay for DBA insurance. 259 Surprisingly, none
of the officials had responses to any of these questions.
The Committee also asked why the DoD had not reported on the success
or failure of the USACE single-provider pilot program. 260 In 2005, the DoD
implemented a single-provider pilot program for USACE to test the possibility of using a single DBA insurance provider for all DoD contracts. 261
After the first six months of the pilot, cost savings exceeded $19 million. 262
In October 2008, the program was expanded to include contracts issued by
the Joint Contracting Command-IraqlMghanistan (JCC-IA).263 During the
House Committee hearing, Congressman Jim Cooper264 asked why the
DoD had not reported on the success of the program. 265 Admiral Ginman
stated that the DoD had incomplete data on the program because it had
been expanded for use by the JCC-IA. 266 The Committee could not understand why, after preliminary data had shown a cost savings of $19 million,
the DoD had not reported on the program or moved to adopt the acquisition
strategy for the DoD.267
In contrast to the success of the pilot program, the House Committee also
addressed allegations regarding abuses under the DoD's open-market system. 268 The Committee focused its questioning on the Army's Logistics
Civil Augmentation Program III (LOGCAP III).269 LOGCAP III was an
immense Army contract performed exclusively by KBR.270 KBR had secured
DBA insurance from AlG under the DoD's open-market system. 271 VVhen
the KBR contract came under the scrutiny of the U.S. Army Audit Agency
(USAAA), USAAA found that KBR was paying "substantially more" in premiums than AlG was expected to pay in claims. 272 Like most contracts requiring DBA insurance, KBR's premiums were reimbursable under a costtype contract. 273 Army auditors found that $284.3 million in DBA premiums
was paid under the LOGCAP III contract between 2003 and 2005, but only
$73.1 million was paid in DBA claims for that period. 274 Senator Waxman
noted that between 2002 and 2007, the top four DBA insurers, who provided
for ninety-nine percent of the DBA insurance at that time, collected $1.5

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

!d.
Id. at 99.
DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 7.
GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at 13.
DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 7.
Congressman Cooper (Democrat, Tennessee) has served from 2003 to the present.
2008 House Hearing, supra note 122, at 99.
Id. at 92.

Id.
Id. at 88.
[d.

!d.
271. !d.

272. GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at 18.
273. See 2008 House Hearing, supra note 122, at 89.
274.Id.
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billion in premiums and were expected to payout an estimated $928 million
in claims and expenses.275 Waxman noted that the thirty-nine percent profit
margin yielded an expected underwriting gain of $585 million for the four
carriers. 276
Weary of the DoD's inaction, Congress eventually mandated that the
DoD adopt a new DBA acquisition strategy in 2008. 277 Section 843 of the
NDAA for 2009 requires the DoD to adopt a strategy that would minimize
costs to both the DoD and defense contractors. 278 Unfortunately, Congress
did not begin to formally investigate claims-processing concerns and
improper claims denial allegations until after the NOAA for 2009 passed. 279
Perhaps this explains why the NDAA for 2009 does not mention performance or claims-processing standards and focuses entirely on minimizing
costs to the Government and defense contractors. In any case, the House
Committee finally addressed allegations that insurance companies were improperly denying claims at the June 2009 hearing. 28o In addition to testimony from wounded contractor veterans, Vice President Major General
George R. Fay (Ret. U.S. Army Reserve), a CNA executive, and Mr. Gary
Pitts, an attorney representing thousands of injured contractors, also provided testimony.28I Several of the witnesses' recommendations were included as possible acquisition strategies in the DoD's 2009 report to Congress; however, none of the recommendations were ultimately supported
by the OoD.282
IV. ACQUISITION STRATEGIES

A. Maintaining the Current Open-Market System
In compliance with the NDAA for 2009 mandate, the DoD submitted a
report to Congress in September 2009 on reform strategies for DBA insurance. 283 The purpose of the report was to propose to Congress an acquisition strategy that would minimize costs to the Government and defense contractors. 284 Since the 2008 House Committee hearings, Congress had been
awaiting the DoD's recommendation regarding whether the USACE program could be implemented DoD-wide. 285 While the DoD had asked
USAAA to conduct a formal audit of the USACE program prior to the
275.

]d.

at 89.

276. ]d.

277. See Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L.
No. 110-417, §843, 122 Stat. 4502, 4540 (2008).
278. ]d.
279. See generally 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14.
280. See generally id.
281. ld. at 129-30 (statement of General Fay) and 124-25 (statement of Mr. Pitts).
282. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 13.
283. 1d. at 1.
284. See id.
285. ld. at i.

Deftme Base Act Imurance

667

2008 House Committee hearings,286 USAAA did not complete the audit
until August 2010, after the DoD submitted its report. 287
Without the Army audit, the DoD collected and presented its own data
from industry and various government agencies. 288 They presented four
basic alternative acquisition systems to Congress: (1) a single-provider system, (2) a multiple-provider system, (3) an open-market system with improvements, and (4) a government self-insurance system. 289 Private industry
clearly favored the current open-market strategy.290 Industry comments expressed the belief that a single-provider system would not achieve the cost
savings experienced by USACE.291 The DoD agreed, making its final recommendation to continue the current open-market strategy, with the addition of some improvements to the system. 292 While the DoD evaluated the
government self-insurance option favorably, it concluded self-insurance was
not a workable alternative because the DoD and the DOL lacked the statutory authority or resources to undertake its implementation. 293
Unfortunately, making minor changes to the current open-market strategy will not reduce costs or result in more equitable claims processing.
The current system, even with the modifications suggested by the DoD,
will continue to result in excessive premiums for contractors and the Government and processing problems for injured contractors. Instead, the solution that offers the most cost savings and provides critical monitoring and
bonding294 of insurance carriers is a multiple-provider system. A brief analysis of each of the four alternatives is presented below, including a discussion of why a multiple-provider system is the optimum solution for all stakeholders, including insurance carriers.

286. See 2008 House Hearing, supra note 122, at 40 (statement of Richard Ginman, Deputy
Director of Contingency Contracting & Acquisition Policy).
287. Most USAAA audit reports are available on USAAA's website, http://www.hqda.army.
miVaaaweb/; however, the USACE pilot-program audit has not been made available as of the
date of this article.
288. See DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 11 (DoD collected data from private
industry, including brokers, insurers, and government contractors, as well as government
agencies).
289. !d. at 39.
290. !d. at 17.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 52.
293. !d. at 57.
294. See Christopher R. Yukins, A Versatile Prism: Assessing Procurement Law Through the Principal-Agent Model, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 63 (2010). Professor Yukins uses the terms "monitoring"
and "bonding" to describe principle-agent relationships in the context of government contracts.
!d. at 65-66. Monitoring is essentially oversight by a principal used to eliminate an agent's diversions from the principal's objectives. Id. Bonding is the use of contractual self-constraints,
such as internal policies, practices, or procedures, designed to reduce diversions. !d. at 66. In
the context of DBA insurance, the Government's objective is to improve reimbursement services
to injured contractors and decrease costs. See, e.g., DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at
i-iii. Achieving this goal is dependent upon the Government's ability to effectively monitor and
bond insurance carriers through its contractual relationship with insurance carriers.
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B. Single-Provider System: An Impracticable Alternative
A number of government agencies have had success with single-provider
insurance in the last decade. The DOS, USAID, and USACE have all benefited from switching from an open-market system-which requires contractors to obtain DBA insurance independently-to a single-provider system, in
which one insurance company contracts with a government agency to provide all DBA insurance. 295 In the early 1990s, an investigation by the
DOS inspector general (IG) found that costs could be saved if the DOS transitioned to a single-provider system. 296 Since that time, DOS has competitively awarded DBA insurance contracts to a single carrier. 297 USAID and,
to some extent, USACE have had similar success with this strategy.298
A single-payer system for the DoD, however, is an impracticable option
for several reasons. First, single-provider insurance would not meet Congress's requirement to maintain a competitive DBA insurance market. In
its mandate to the DoD, Congress listed a number of factors that it considered essential to the adoption of a new strategy, including providing a competitive marketplace for insurance to the maximum extent practicable. 299

Although single-provider insurance would be competitively awarded, all of
the DoD's business would go to one provider. Thus, Congress would
never seriously consider such a system.
Second, no one insurance carrier has the infrastructure to support an
organization the size of the DoD. While carriers have insured large government agencies in the past, the DoD is unique. The DoD has approximately
2.1 million military and civilian employees,300 compared to the DOS's
60,000 employees 301 and USAID's 2,200 employees. 302 In addition to the
armed forces, the DoD includes the Defense Commissary Agency, the
Defense Financing and Accounting Service, the Defense Logistics Agency,
and the Defense Information Systems Agency, among other agencies. 303
Based on its enormity, it is unlikely that anyone carrier has the administrative and financial resources to be the DoD's sole insurance provider.
Third, the risks associated with providing DBA insurance to an organization with the DoD's mission is not likely to be borne by one insurance carrier. While the DOS and USAID conduct missions all over the world,
295. See supra Part IV.B.
296. See GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at 12.
297. DoD REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 7.
298. See supra Part IV.B.
299. Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No.
110-417, § 843(b)(5), 122 Stat. 4502, 4540 (2008).
300. About the Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., http://www.defense.gov/
about (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
301. Mission, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://careers.state.govllearnlwhat-we-do/mission
(last visited Mar. 5, 2011).
302. Ken Dilanian, Short-Staffed USAID Tries to Keep Pace, USA TODAY (Feb. 1,2009), http://
www.usatoday.comlnews/washingtonl2009-02-01-aid-inside_N.htm.
303. Department of Defense (DOD), USA.GOV, http://www.usa.gov/AgencieslFederallExecutivei
Defense.shtml (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
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neither of those departments houses the armed forces. The risks associated
with insuring military contractors are higher than those associated with supporting the DOS and USAID.J04 Although carriers have collected more
claims data in the last decade, they remain wary of the DBA insurance market. JOS In the DoD's report to Congress, carriers were obviously reticent
regarding whether they would compete for a single-provider contract. J06
The DoD reported that "one of the largest DBA carriers ... would entertain
the possibility of bidding on a single-provider contract."307 Two other insurance carriers indicated that they would not compete. 308
Recent competition for DBA contracts has attracted fewer insurance carriers than in the past. After initial success with an award to CIGNA Property
and Casualty Insurance (CIGNA) in 1991, the DOS solicited a similar followon multiyear contract in 2000. 309 Four insurance carriers submitted proposals,
including CIGNA, AID, Ace International, and CNA. 310 CNA was eventually
awarded the contract. 311 In 2008, however, when both the DOS and USAID
issued solicitations for a single provider of DBA insurance, the only company
to submit an offer was CNA.312 Likewise, in 2005, the DoD-sponsored pilot
program for USACE received only one offer, also from CNA.313 Thus, it is
seriously questionable whether competition for a single-provider contract
would attract enough competition to satisfy Congress.

C. Multiple-Provider System: Taking Control of DBA Insurance
During the House Committee hearings in June 2009, the Committee
heard testimony from the executive vice president of CNA, General
Fay.314 CNA had been the sole insurance provider for DOS since 2001
and for USAID since 2005. 315 Based on his experience in public service
and as vice president of CNA, General Fay recommended that the DoD
adopt, with modifications, a single-provider program similar to those utilized by the DOS and USAID.316 To compensate for the problems associated with insuring an organization of the DoD's size, he recommended separating the DoD into divisions, each with its own single provider of DBA
insurance.317 By dividing the DoD by department or agency groupings, divi304. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 18.
305. Id. at 4-5 Oisting problems related to the DBA insurance market in comparison with
stateside workers' compensation).
306. Id. at 17.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at 12.
310. /d.
311. Id.
312. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 7.
313. See GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at 12.
314. 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 129-30.
315. Id.
316. Id. (statement of General George Fay, Executive Vice President of CNA).
317.Id.
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sions could be created that are small enough to be homogenous and supportable by a single provider, yet large enough to diversify the volatility of
risks. 3lB This network of multiple providers offers a number of advantages
to industry and government.
1. Privity of Contract
A multiple-provider system would create pnvIty of contract between
insurance carriers and the Government, giving the Government greater control over the DBA insurance process. The current system can too easily be
manipulated to the detriment of claimants and the Government. Because
contractors secure DBA insurance on the open market, privity of contract exists only between contractors and insurance carriers. Contractors have little
incentive to negotiate for more competitive rates because their costs are ultimately reimbursed by the Government. 31 9 Furthermore, the Government
cannot effectively monitor claims processing due to its lack of authority
over the claims process. While the DOL provides some monitoring function
in the dispute process, they have no authority to override decisions of insurance carriers. 32o Thus, when disputes arise between claimants and carriers,
the outcome is fortuitous. Claimants receive no assistance from their employers because their employer is either disputing the claim itself or is not
interested in challenging the insurance carrier. Only after the case winds
its way through the administrative dispute labyrinth can claimants obtain
relief. 321 In other words, the current open-market system has a high potential for abuse and offers few remedies when cost or perfonnance problems
arise with insurance carriers.
On the other hand, if privity of contract existed between insurance carriers and government agencies, the Government would be afforded advantages in both contract formation and perfonnance. During contract fonnation, competition among offerors would keep premium rates down, as
would effective negotiating by government agencies. 322 But even more importantly, government agencies would have discretion to award contracts
based on past performance and customer satisfaction metrics. 323 This
could be a tremendous boon for claimants, whose fate has thus far been
dependent on the sophistication and vigilance of their employers in securing
quality insurance. Finally, by directly contracting with insurance carriers,
COs could make responsibility determinations based on whether carriers

318. 1d.

319. See GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at 15 (2010).
320. 1d. at 10.
321. See id. (describing the three-step formal appeals process as well as the optional informal
resolution process).
322. See 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 138 (statement of General George Fay, Executive Vice President of CNA).
323. See, e.g., FAR 9.2.
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have in fact obtained DBA insurance-a potentially potent preventative
mechanism.
While the contract formation process would allow the Government to
achieve cost and quality assurance objectives, the monitoring and bonding
inherent in the performance of government contracts would ensure fulfillment of carriers' obligations. For example, privity of contract would entitle
the Government to all the remedy-granting clauses available under the
FAR.324 Thus, insurance carriers would always have an incentive to properly
pay claims to avoid default. 325 If the insurance carrier was improperly denying claims, the CO could not only have the option of defaulting the contractor for failure to perform,326 but could also document the carrier's poor performance in the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information
System (FAPIIS), a government database that tracks companies' past performance. 327 These negative performance reports could have serious consequences regarding a contractor's future opportunities with the U.S. Government. In summary, a multiple provider system would give the Government
greater control over the claims process by providing remedies to keep insurance carriers aligned with government objectives. Unlike the DOL's dispute
process, this system has the capability to correct inefficiencies and avoid
abuses that exploit injured contractors.
2. Potential for Cost Savings
There is general disagreement among stakeholders, including the DoD,
the insurance industry, and contractors, regarding the potential for cost savings under any of the alternatives. The DOS, USAID, and USACE have all
adopted the single-provider system and have experienced cost savings. 328
VVhile the DoD is too large for a single-provider system, the multiple-provider
system offers many of the same features. There are two clear cost advantages
if the DoD implements a multiple-provider system. First, a multipleprovider system would not require minimum premium payments that contractors are required to pay under an open-market system. 329 Under an
open-market system, insurance premiums are paid as a percentage of total
payroll, such as $10 per $100 of payroll.330 Insurance carriers, however,
sometimes require contractors with a small number of employees or limited
payrolls to make minimum premium payments in addition to, or instead of, a
percentage of their payroll.331 VVhile this may not sound like a significant
amount of money, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee
324. FAR 49.402-2.
325. Id.; see also FAR 52.249-8.
326. FAR 52.249-8(a)(1)(i).
327. See FED. AWARDEE PERFORMANCE & INTEGRITY INFO. SYs., https:llfapiis.ppirs.gov/ Oast
visited Mar. 5, 2012).
328. See supra Part IV.B.
329. See Memorandum from the Majority Staff, supra note 144, at 14.
330. See id.
331. See id.
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found forty-seven contractors that paid more in insurance premiums than they
paid in salaries. H2
Second, the Government would have some control over premium rates
through the negotiated procurement process. Rates are currently negotiated between contractors and insurance carriers, usually with the assistance of a broker.H3 The Government reimburses contractors under
cost-type contracts regardless of how much carriers charge, so there is
no incentive for brokers to negotiate lower rates. 334 Overall, a multipleprovider system would allow the Government to curb excess costs in the
system, such as eliminating minimum premium charges, and maintain control over the rates carriers charge through the use of more aggressive negotiating tactics.
3. Competition

One final advantage that is integral to the multiple-provider system is the
guarantee of DBA insurance for all contractors. In the current open-market
system, fledgling contractors are often unable to secure DBA insurance due
to their risk. H5 Thus, they are not able to compete for government contracts,
reducing overall competition in the procurement process. A multiple-provider
system manages risky contractors through risk "pooling."H6 Pooling allows an
insurer to pool the risks of multiple contractors so that risks can be spread
across all contractors in the pool.337 This system results in lower premiums
and allows all contractors to obtain DBA insurance regardless of their
risk. 338 Under an open-market system, since contractors obtain insurance
individually, the benefits of risk pooling are not as direct.
The multiple-provider solution therefore offers enhancements far superior to the current DBA strategy. Nevertheless, additional components,
beyond monitoring and bonding, are necessary to crystallize protections
for contractor veterans returning from war.

332. 1d. Since 2002, over 700 contractors have been required to make minimum premium
payments amounting to about $8.5 million.
333. See id. at 4-6.
334. See, e.g., id. at 8.
335. See SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. MG. RECONSTRUCTION, SIGAR AUDIT 11-15, CONfRACT
PERFORMANCE AND OVERSIGHTIDEFENSE BASE ACT INSURANCE: WEAKNESS IN THE USACE
DEFENSE BASE ACT INSURANCE PROGRAM LED TO AS MUCH AS $58.5 MILLION IN REFUNDS NOT
RETURNED TO THE U.S. GoVERNMENf AND OTHER PROBLEMS 2,23 Ouly 28,2011), available at
http://www.sigar.miVpdflaudits/SIGAR%20Audit-II-15.pdf; GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119,
at 12,26; DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 40,55.
336. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 1.3, at 12-13 (West 1988);
Memorandum from the Majority Staff, supra note 144, at 8-9.
337. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 336; see also, e.g., Memorandum from the Majority
Staff, supra note 144, at 8-9.
338. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 336; GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at 26; Memorandum from the Majority Staff, supra note 144, at 8-9.
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4. Additional Protections for Contractors
The multiple-provider system allows the Government to properly monitor and bond insurance carriers during contract formation and contract performance. Such controls will result in reasonable premium rates and proper
claims processing. Three additional components, however, must be implemented to specifically target the denial of complex claims-a problem that
has scourged the system. First, DOL district directors should have the
authority to issue binding decisions during the informal dispute resolution
process. Second, the Government must self-insure against the risk of
PTSD and TBI. Third, the fourteen-day rule for payment of claims should
be extended to allow insurance carriers adequate time to investigate complex
claims.
Many of the problems experienced by injured contractors are a result of
financial hardships imposed on claimants when their claims are denied and
delayed during the dispute process. 339 A subtle change in the allocation of
risk between contractors and insurance carriers, however, would eliminate
this problem. Presently, district directors can only make nonbinding recommendations to the parties. 340 Naturally, when carriers receive an adverse recommendation, they simply ignore it. 341 Thus, the process expends the time
and resources of the Government, claimants, and insurance carriers without
bringing any resolution to the case.
In contrast, allowing district directors to make binding decisions brings
greater equity and efficiency to the process without sacrificing the rights
of the parties to appeal their case to OWCP administrative law judges.
Industry experts have admitted that carriers are denying claims simply to
gain more time to investigate. 342 Binding decisions would help reduce the
misuse of the system and eliminate prolonged appeals meant to delay the
decision-making process. 343
A second critical tool to protect contractors suffering from mental illness
is government self-insurance for PTSD and TBI cases. On June 18, 2009,
the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee held a hearing
to address their concerns about PTSD and TBI. 344 Mr. Gary Pitts, an attorney for PTSD and TBI claimants, made four recommendations to the Committee: (1) increase funding and personnel in the Office of Administrative
Law Judges, (2) allow contractors with PTSD to receive treatment from
the Veterans Administration (VA), (3) require insurance carriers to notify
339. See GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at 24; Memorandum from the Majority Staff, supra
note 144, at 2, 14-15.
340. See DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 54.
341. See id.
342. See 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 25.
343. This particular recommendation was supported by DoD in its report to Congress.
Strangely, the recommendation was not formally offered for adoption, as DoD considered improvements to the efficiency of the DBA program to be outside the scope of their charter pursuant to section 843 of the NDAA for 2009. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 54.
344. See generally 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14.
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widows of their right to file claims on behalf of their spouses, and (4) give
administrative law judges the power to assess a ten percent penalty for insurance carriers filing frivolous defenses to contractor claims. 345
All of Mr. Pitts' recommendations would be valuable additions to the
claims process. But his suggestion to have the VA treat civilians with
PTSD is simply unattainable due to insurmountable political and administrative hurdles. The VA is so overwhelmed with military veterans from the
wars of the last two decades 346 that putting such a strain on the system
could be catastrophic. Nevertheless, Mr. Pitts' premise is quite perceptive.
The cost of litigating PTSD can often surpass the cost of providing treatment. 347 The situation is ripe for a reallocation of risk. If carriers cannot
accept liability for these claims, it is only reasonable for the Government
to self-insure.
Government self-insurance offers a number of benefits to DBA stakeholders. First, the Government could ensure proper processing of PTSD
claims. Second, insurance carriers, who lack critical data on contractor injuries related to PTSD, would be relieved of any liability for such claims.
Third, lower premiums could be negotiated in exchange for the reduction
of carrier risk. Lastly, business opportunities would abound, as carriers
would still playa role in the administration of these claims for the Government. If insurance carriers cannot manage the risk associated with mental
health claims, then it is clear that the risk should be reallocated. Government
self-insurance would safeguard injured contractors from mistreatment and
would save the Government valuable resources by removing the transactions
costs associated with disputing liability.
A third and final component to address the problem of carriers denying
complex claims is an extension of the fourteen-day period in which insurance
carriers are expected to pay claims. 348 Although the rule was intended to
speed the processing of claims, it has created an incentive for carriers to
do the exact opposite. The current industry practice is to deny complex
claims to buy time for carriers and employers to investigate. 349 The proposed time extension is a reasonable one, provided it does not prevent claimants from paying medical bills, rent, mortgage, and other monthly family
obligations.
345. 1d.

at 124-25.

346. See, e.g., DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, AUDIT OF VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION TRANsmON AsSISTANCE FOR OPERATIONS ENDURING AND IRAQI
FREEDOM SERVICE MEMBERS AND VETERANS, REpORT No. 06-03552-169 GULY 200S); U.S.
GoV'T ACCOUNTAIlILITY OFFICE, GAO-OS-473T, VETERANS' DISABILITY BENEFITS: VETERANS'
DISABILITY BENEFITS CLAIMS PROCESSING CHALLENGES PERSIST, WHILE VA CONTINUES TO
TAKE STEPS TO ADDRESS THEM (200S); U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-OS-901,
VETERANS' DISABILITY BENEFITS: BETTER ACCOUNTABILITY AND ACCESS WOULD OOROVE THE
BENEFITS DELIVERY AT DISCHARGE PROGRAM (200S).
347. See 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 127.
34S. 20 C.F.R. § 702.232 (2011).
349. See 2009 House Hearing, supra note 14, at 25.
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In summary, while a multiple-provider solution provides greater control
over the processing of DBA claims, a reallocation of risk is crucial in
order to protect the rights of contractor veterans in complex claims cases.
District directors must be given the authority to issue binding decisions.
Government self-insurance for PTSD and TBI cases is essential if Congress
is at all interested in providing relief to claimants and their families. Finally,
due to the complexity of certain DBA claims, the fourteen-day rule should be
extended, when appropriate, to give insurance carriers adequate time to
investigate claims. These changes should be paramount to the budget and
fiscal concerns that have dominated the acquisition strategy discussions to
date.
5. Outcomes versus Costs
Government officials have been concerned about the costs associated with
the open-market strategy since the 1970s,350 yet the DoD has resisted any
deviation from the current open-market system. 351 Between 2003 and
2005 as DBA insurance costs were escalating, USAAA audit reports found
that the Army's LOGCAP contracts, which all secure DBA insurance on
the open market, had "substantial" underwriting gains and multiple DBA
compliance failures. 352 In 2007, an analysis by the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) concluded that the risk-pooling approach of the single- and
multiple-provider systems could lower the DoD's DBA insurance costs by
as much as $362 million over a ten-year period. 353 And finally, USACE
reportedly experienced cost savings in the first six months of the DoDsponsored single-provider pilot program of $19 million. 354 Yet, in its 2009
report to Congress, the DoD ignored these findings and insisted that the
current strategy is the most inexpensive way to secure DBA insurance. 355
The bottom line is that no stakeholder has been able to demonstrate with
any certainty that one alternative would yield greater cost savings than
another alternative. Congress argues that the rising cost of DBA insurance
has been a concern for forty years. 356 They rely on GAO reports and
USAAA audit reports to support their conclusion that reform is needed. 357
The DoD relies on data in its 2009 congressional report to tout the benefits
of the current open-market strategy.358 This difference in perspective is precisely why the debate must focus more on system outcomes rather than costs.
Congress and the DoD should be engaged in a cost-benefit analysi~ rather
350. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 192, at 4.
351. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Majority Staff, supra note 144, at 10. But see, e.g., DoD
REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 7 (DoD piloted a non-open-market program).
352. See GRASSO ET AL., supra note 119, at IS, 20.
353. Memorandum from the Majority Staff, supra note 144, at 12.
354. Id. at II.
355. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at ii.
356. U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 192, at 4.
357. See Memorandum from the Majority Staff, supra note 144, at 9, 12.
35S. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at ii.
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than limiting the debate to conflicting cost studies. The fact that there are so
many uncertainties regarding whether any particular system would result in
savings to the Government further bolsters the argument that outcomes
must be given greater weight in the decision-making process.
Many of the benefits of a multiple-provider system have been discussed.
Foremost on this list is the contractual remedies that would be available if
carriers continued to exploit injured contractors. The Government has a
moral and legal obligation to protect its contractor veterans. 359 It is unconscionable that contractors have been treated as collateral damage. By implementing a multiple-provider system, the Government could more closely
monitor insurance carriers to make sure claims are processed appropriately.
A multiple-provider system would also allow all contractors to compete on
equal footing in the acquisition arena. Rather than being denied DBA coverage and foreclosed from competition, every contractor, regardless of
size, would be able to obtain DBA insurance at comparable rates. Thus,
the system fulfills Congress's requirement for maximizing competition. Congress has long sought to change the way DBA insurance is procured. 36o The
discussion should be expanded, however, to include a cost-benefit analysis in
addition to the current cost-saving discussion.

D. Maintaining the Status Quo
The DoD recommends keeping the current open-market strategy but makes
four suggestions for improving the system. 361 These include (1) making loss
data accessible to all D BAcarriers, (2) creating contractor risk pools for contractors unable to obtain DBA insurance, (3) requiring carriers to separate DBA
insurance pricing from other types of insurance, and (4) establishing a single
DoD contact for country-specific D BAinsurance waivers. 362 The DoD considered the cost savings of a government self-insurance approach in its report to
Congress but dismissed the approach because of the time required for implementation. 363 While the DoD's suggestions seem to be aimed at bringing
more transparency to the process, the impact of such changes would do little
to resolve the cost and claims-processing problems under the current system.
The DoD has used the open-market strategy since the advent of DBA
insurance in 1941. 364 Under this system, contractors secure their own DBA
insurance from a list of approved carriers maintained by the DOL.365 Con359. See, e.g., Mutual Security Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-477, § 502, 72 Stat. 261, 272
(amending the DBA (42 U.s.c. § 1651) to apply to service contracts by adding a new subparagraph (5) to subsection (1 )(a».
360. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163,
§ 1041, 119 Stat. 3136, 3430 (2006) (Congress directed the Department of Defense to examine
the best way to procure DBA insurance).
361. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 54.
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Majority Staff, supra note 144, at 4.
365. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 7.
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tractors may also self-insure if they have the financial means to do so and have
been approved by the DOL.366 Proponents claim the free-market approach is
the best means available to control costs. 367 Insurance carriers compete for
DBA insurance business in the open market, which, in theory, allows contractors to obtain the best possible premium rates. 368
There are, however, major drawbacks to an open-market strategy. The
Government does not maintain privity of contract with insurance carriers,
which leaves the Government with fewer remedies when carriers stray
from the Government's objectives. 369 The DOL oversees but is not responsible for processing DBA claims and has little authority over insurance carriers.37o Injured contractors disputing claims must await the final decision of
OWCP administrative law judges before obtaining relief, which can take
months or years. 37l Further, the Government has no authority over premiums negotiated between contractors and insurance carriers even though
the Government pays the costs. 372 And, while premium rates may be
lower in some cases, the open-market system has recently seen uncontrollable rises in cost, excessive profits by carriers, and unacceptably high denial
rates for PTSD claims. 373 Due to these concerns, the current strategy falls
short of stakeholders' moral and statutory obligations to contractor veterans,
even with the improvements suggested by the DoD.
On the other hand, the DoD's recommendation to make loss data accessible to all DBA carriers in a nationwide database should be implemented, as
it would help carriers better understand DBA risks and provide greater
transparency in the acquisition process. Such an improvement, however,
does not resolve Congress's immediate cost and claims-processing concerns.
The DoD has increasingly relied on contractors since the beginning of the
Persian Gulf War in 1991. 374 Three insurance carriers have provided
ninety-seven percent of the DBA insurance to these contractors: (1) AlG,
(2) CNA, and (3) ACE Group.375 These carriers "contend that the early
years [of war] in Iraq and Mghanistan were novel situations and that

366. See id. A contractor may self-insure either by taking steps to financially prepare for losses
on their own or by establishing a legally licensed insurance company, known as a "captive
insurer." Id. Eight employers are listed by DOL as self-insured. See Division of Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation (DLHWC), U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/owcp/
dlhwc!lscarrier.htm#authorized self-insured employers (last visited Mar. 8, 2012) (listing eight
employers as self-insured for DBA).
367. See, e.g., DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 19.
368. See, e.g., id. at 38.
369. See supra Part IV.C.l.
370. See supra Part II.B.
371. See id.
372. See supra Part IV.C.l.
373. See supra Part IILA.
374. James P. Terry, Privatizing Defense Support Operations: The Need to Improve DoD's Oversight and Management, ARMED FORCES & SOC'y 660 (2010), available at http://afs.sagepub.coml
contentI36/4/660.full.pdf+html.
375. DoD REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 28.
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premiums have declined because carriers now have a better understanding of
the nature of the hazards in those regions."376
While it is true that these three carriers have been able to collect claims
data for the last two decades, cost and claims-processing problems have
not been reduced. 377 USAAA audit reports and GAO reports in the last
five years have found rising DBA costs and wild fluctuations in insurance
rates. 378 Thus, sharing claims data will not resolve the current problems.
Perhaps it is the nature of wartime contracting that makes the risk so unpredictable: each conflict depends greatly on geographical, political, military,
social, and economic factors. A national DBA claims database is surely an
improvement over individual carriers tracking claims. Data collected by
the major DBA insurers, however, have not yet resulted in decreased costs
of DBA insurance. 379
The DoD also suggests creating contractor risk pools that would require
larger insurers to provide insurance to high-risk contractors who cannot otherwise obtain insurance on their own. 380 This improvement attempts to mirror a multiple-provider system that uses risk pools to provide coverage to all
contractors. Under an open-market system, however, there is no way to
guarantee that riskier contractors will be offered fair-market rates. Unlike
a multiple-provider system, where government agencies would negotiate
rates for all contractors in the risk pool, the Government could not control
the premiums charged to high-risk contractors. This recommendation
would therefore not result in the same type of leveling for high-risk contrac- .
tors that would result under a multiple-provider system.
The DoD also suggests mandating that insurers do not bundle DBA coverage with other insurance coverage and identifying a single point of contact
for the DBA waiver process. 381 Neither suggestion would correct current
cost and claims-processing issues. Since the majority of insurers do not follow the practice of bundling DBA insurance with other coverage, such as
accidental death or kidnap and ransom insurance, the recommendation
does little to bring resolution to current acquisition problems. 382 Further,
a single DoD point of contact for waivers would have little or no impact
on the problems at hand. Waivers affect a small number of contractors, as
they are only granted for foreign nationals and only if acceptable workers'
compensation benefits are provided by applicable local law. 383 Thus, this
recommendation would do little to solve current cost and claims-processing
Issues.
376. See
377. See
37B. See
379. See
380. See

id. at 19.
GRASSO ET AL.,

supra note 119, at B.

id. at lB.
id.

DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 55.
3B1. See id. at 56.
382. See id. The DoD identified one insurer that bundled DBA insurance coverage with other
insurance coverage. See id.
383. Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.c. § 1651(e) (2006).
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In summary, the DoD's recommendation to keep the status quo, with the
exception of four cosmetic changes to the system, is a paltry attempt to assist
injured contractors or to address serious congressional concerns. Sharing
claims loss data may bring more transparency to the process. The data collected by AIG, however, which provides seventy-five percent of DBA insurance business, certainly has not helped that company lower premiums. Risk
pooling would resolve the problem of carriers refusing to insure risky contractors, but the Government has no way of guaranteeing reasonable rates
for those contractors. Waivers and transparency in pricing would improve
the acquisition system, but again these improvements do not address Congress's immediate concerns. Thus, adopting the DoD's recommendation
does almost nothing to resolve cost and claims-processing issues.
E. Government Self-Insurance: An Ideal Alternative
A multiple-provider system would provide many advantages to both the
Government and private industry and can be implemented using the existing
statutory framework for DBA insurance. An ideal alternative, however, and
one that has garnered at least moderate support from Congress and industry384 is government self-insurance. Self-insurance offers perhaps the greatest system for distribution of benefits to injured contractors, as well as the
highest potential for cost savings. One caveat is that this option would
require significant changes to existing DBA statutes and would therefore
take time to implement. 385 Thus, Congress should continue researching
implementation of this alternative and, if the data are supportive, begin taking steps to execute transition.
Insurance companies are an essential component of risk management. In
the volatile business of DBA insurance, however, carriers must often insure
against risk with inadequate data and under unpredictable circumstances. 386
Given these conditions, carriers charge higher premiums to cover a broader
range of potential liability, resulting in higher costs for the Government. 387
In government contracting, agencies avoid this situation by allocating risk to
the Government. 388 This way, contractors are able to calculate their costs
and submit offers to the Government without having to adjust for unknown
risk. 389 Self-insurance achieves this goal by shifting the risk from insurance carriers-who have had trouble calculating their risk in Iraq and
Afghanistan-to the Government. 390 Private industry supports this system because insurance carriers would be in the best position to offer
384. DoD REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 52; see also 2008 House Hearing, supra note
122, at 97.
385. See DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 54. DoD estimates it would take at
least three years to implement government self-insurance.
386. See supra Part IV.D.
387. See id.
388. Weiner, supra note 141, at 23.
389. See Boardman, supra note 132, at 833.
390. See DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 20.
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third-party administration of the system by capitalizing on their unique
infrastructure. 391 Thus, because of the uncertainty of risk involved in providing DBA insurance, self-insurance offers an appropriate allocation of
risk for the parties while preserving business opportunities for private
industry.
Many of Congress's claims-processing concerns can be alleviated through
this shifting of risk. By employing a third-party administrator who is not liable for the claims they process, the Government removes any impartiality or
business incentive to deny claims. Fees for administrators would be generated on a per-case basis irrespective of acceptance or denial of liability and
would likely reduce problems associated with improper denial of claims. If
the Government did encounter problems with denial of claims, it could
address the issue directly with the administrator and realign processing
with the Government's objectives. The administrator would be under contract with the Government and therefore would be monitored using all the
contractual remedies provided to the Government under the FAR. Thus,
even if the administrator strayed from the Government's objectives, government oversight inherent in the government acquisition system would allow
for correction of any problems.
Another benefit to claimants and carriers alike would be the elimination
of WHCA determinations. As mentioned above, carriers often deny claims
until an administrative law judge finds that an employee's injury resulted
from a war-risk hazard. 392 This bifurcation of claims processing for warrisk hazards and non-war-risk hazards claims has caused claimants immeasurable hardship.393 Self-insurance would eliminate the bifurcation of claims
and lessen the needless suffering of contractor veterans.
One final benefit of self-insurance is that it achieves a greater emphasis on
contractor safety. Acting as the primary insurer for DBA benefits, the Government would be remiss to not place considerable weight on contractor
safety. As both a past performance and an award fee evaluation factor, the
Government would likely put a high premium on contractors' risk management performance and safety records. 394 Contractors would surely pay more
attention to safety if they expected COs to closely scrutinize such data.
In addition to the benefits claimants would realize under self-insurance,
Congress, the DoD, and private industry all agree that the system has a
high potential for cost savings. 395 Under this system, the Government
391. Private industry has shown support for third-party administration of a government selfinsurance system, and obviously favors the option over government-run insurance, whereby the
Government would act as its own administrator. See id. at 19. Still, some critics argue the system
results in a net loss of private business. See id. However, companies previously unable to absorb
the liability would now be able to participate as administrators. See id. Thus, the benefit of increasing industry participation is likely to offset any negative effect. See id.
392. See 20 C.F.R. § 61.101 (2011); OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPo PROGRAMS, supra note 158.
393. See DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 3.
394. Id. at 43.
395. Id. at 19.
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pays workers' compensation claims much the same way it pays federal civilian employees' claims. Injured workers file claims with the Government,
which then pays claims without relying on a third-party insurer. 396 Selfinsurance eliminates the role of insurance carriers as agents of the Government, and thus avoids the excess monitoring and bonding costs of single- or
multiple-provider systems.
Removing the "middle man" offers notable benefits to stakeholders. First,
DBA premiums would be eliminated completely. Contractors would no
longer include DBA insurance as a direct cost of their contracts. Second,
the Government would not pay administrative or other indirect fees that
are typically appended to insurance premiums. All fees other than those
going to the claimant and the third-party administrator would be eliminated,
including. broker commissions, sales and marketing costs, and profit. 397
Thus, the difference between the cost to compensate injured workers and
the cost of actual losses would be significantly less than under any other
insurance system. Further, since costs incurred would predominantly come
from the reimbursement of actual losses, the Government would not be
affected by financial markets or other financial factors affecting the insurance
industry. Overall, the Government would retain greater control over the cost
of DBA insurance under this system.
Despite these benefits, there are a number of arguments against government self-insurance. The greatest of these concerns is the time it would
take to implement the system. The threat of "bigger government" would
unquestionably draw furious debate from political and industry opponents.
Concerns over funding for Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and even
the Postal Service raise questions about government management of reimbursement programs. Time, however, should hardly be considered an
impediment. More discourse on the topic should be encouraged, as such
democratic discussions would only bring more transparency to the process.
Congress and the DoD, eminently concerned with costs, would benefit from
public opinion on more important matters such as coverage for contractors
suffering from PTSD and TBI. Moreover, as long as the DoD adopted a
multiple-provider system during the interim period, there would be no
harm in waiting for Congress to pass legislation making the Government
more accountable for injured workers.
Other than time, opponents have struggled to articulate why self-insurance
would not be an ideal system. Critics have argued that if contractors are no
longer required to obtain their own insurance, they are less likely to provide
a safe workplace. 398 Based on the discussion above, this argument lacks
merit. 399 On the contrary, contractors would be much more safety-focused
396.
397.
398.
399.

5 U.S.c. § 8147(a) (2006).
DoD REpORT
Id. at 19.
See supra Part

TO CONGRESS,

rv.E.

supra note 39, at 43.
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if the Government was self-insuring, as contractor safety records would
receive greater scrutiny.400
Opponents also argue that because of the unknown risks associated with
DBA insurance, self-insurance might create Anti-Deficiency Act issues. 401
These concerns are warranted. Nevertheless, the Government should be
able to accurately estimate the cost of DBA claims using DBA claims data
from the DoL, as well as data from the recently implemented SPOT system. 402 Additionally, the Government has been in the business of insuring
employees for some time, and the system has never created Anti-Deficiency
Act problems. For example, the Government maintains the Federal Employees' Compensation Fund, which pays workers' compensation claims to federal civilian employees. 403 Each year, the secretary of labor provides the
OMB with an estimated cost so that the necessary monies can be appropriated. 404 Each government agency employing injured civilians assists the
secretary in collecting claims data by submitting the total cost of benefits
paid from FECA during the preceding year. 405 Agencies then request
funds equal to the estimated cost of claims to be paid for the following
year. 406 Through this statutorily mandated process, the Government has
avoided running afoul of the Anti-Deficiency Act. 407 A very similar process
could be imposed and managed by a third-party administrator. The administrator would collect claims data from contractors and pass the information
on to the Government. This is just one example of how the Government
could avoid violating fiscal law.
Finally, critics argue that self-insurance goes against Congress's mandate
for the DoD to adopt an acquisition strategy that promotes competition in
the insurance marketplace. 408 Quite the contrary, Congress, the DoD, and
the insurance industry, including some brokers,409 are interested in selfinsurance because it provides a unique business opportunity for insurance
carriers. The DoD employs more than 718,000 civilian personne1. 410
Managing the claims of these employees would provide an incredible revenue stream for any insurance carrier. Carriers already have the infrastructure
in place to perform claims processing for large government agencies. And,
without being required to accept the risk of insuring contractors overseas,
business would be relatively consistent and predictable. The House Over400. See id.
401. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, mpra note 39, at 19.
402. See Booz ALLEN HMm.TON, SPOT, SYNCHRONIZED PREDEPLOYMENT & OPERATIONAL
TRACKER TRAINING WORKBOOK FOR GoVERNMENT ORGANIZATION USERS (Oct. 2009), available
at https:llspot.altess.anny.miVResources/GovemmencOrganization_Workbook. pdf.
403. 5 U.S.c. §8147(a) (2006).
404. !d.
405. [d. §8147(b).
406. [d.
407. See id. § 8147(a).
408. DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, mpra note 39, at 19.
409. See id. at 20.
410. About the Department of Defense (DOD), mpra note 300.
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sight and Government Refonn Committee noted that CNA experienced
losses of about $15 million between 2002 and 2007 on contracts with
DOS, USAlD, and USACE.411 By removing the underwriting risk and capitalizing on the infrastructure and services that insurance carriers can provide
to the Government, carriers could develop a very profitable industry. Congress's requirement for competition in the marketplace would certainly be
met by awarding contracts for these services through the government contract process.
Overall, the arguments against self-insurance do not carry much weight.
If, as stakeholders say, self-insurance is simply a matter of time, then the
Government should begin taking immediate steps to move the proper legislation through Congress.

v. CONCLUSION: THE WAY AHEAD
All DBA stakeholders recognize the benefits of government self-insurance. 412 But until Congress has an opportunity to develop a strategy for implementing self-insurance, a multiple-provider acquisition strategy offers the
best interim solution. Transitioning to a multiple-provider system would not
require extensive statutory change and could be implemented in a relatively
short period of time. Procuring the services of multiple carriers to provide
insurance to agencies or divisions within the DoD is already achievable.
Furthennore, a multiple-provider system would offer several key benefits
that would pave the way for government self-insurance. First, and most importantly, a multiple-provider system would provide privity of contract with
insurance carriers. This contractual relationship would allow government
agencies to retain control over the claims process and would infuse muchneeded accountability into the DBA insurance system. Additionally, granting
DOL district directors the authority to issue binding decisions would eliminate the financial strain on injured contractors and their families during the
appeals process. Self-insuring against the risk of PTSD and TBI would save
the Government and other stakeholders valuable resources currently wasted
on needless litigation. It would put the risk of insuring against mental illness
on the Government, and would restore accountability in a system that hasfor the last decade-facilitated the profiteering of wounded Americans.
In summary, the way in which the United States fights wars has changed
over the last two decades. If the United States wishes to continue its reliance
on overseas contractors, then it must recognize its moral obligation to the
men and women sacrificing their lives to support our armed forces. It is
shameful that contractors seeking treatment for mental illness due to roadside
bombs and improvised explosive devices are turned away by insurance carriers.
411. See Memorandum from the Majority Staff, supra note 144, at 8-9.
412. See DoD REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 39, at 52; 2008 House Hearing, supra note 122,
at 97.
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Sending civilians into war has consequences, but those consequences
should not be borne by the children and spouses of our contractor veterans.
After nearly forty years, Congress has finally mandated adoption of a new
acquisition strategy. It is astounding that the DoD has suggested maintaining the same open-market strategy that will continue to exploit wounded
Americans serving in Iraq and Mghanistan. While keeping the status quo
may be the simplest solution, it betrays the age-old military ethos that no
American should ever be left behind.

